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The Warren Court Critics: Where Are
They Now That We Need Them?
By IsIDORE SILVER*

I. Introduction
In the 1960's the Warren Court became-the object of an intensive
barrage of scholarly criticism that pervaded the law reviews and spilled
over into both popular legal writing and nonprofessional journals.1 The
critics, eminent constitutional scholars with diverse views, demonstrated
not only broad knowledge but also literary excellence. They saw themselves as guardians of the temple of law against the doctrinal invaders
and against those who temporarily resided within that temple. Among
those invaders were classed most of the Warren Court judges.
Today, the temple is unguarded. Most of the original invaders
have vanished, but their replacements have, on occasion, upset icons
and raised little or no protest. Where are the sentinels? Why the
disinclination to guard the sacred reliquaries against the depredations
of the Burger Court? This essay will attempt to answer these questions; for there is something seriously amiss when the practice of informed criticism by the best minds in the profession has fallen into desuetude, as it has in the last six years.
Many eminent scholars played diverse roles as commentators on
the Warren Court, at first supportive and later critical as the Court
changed complexion.' Although there were numerous critics of the
( Isidore Silver 1976.
* Professor of Constitutional Law and History, John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, City University of New York.
1. "mhe Warren years were marked not only by an increasingly activist Court
but also by an increasingly dissatisfied and prolific group of legal scholars." Wright,
ProfessorBickel, the Scholarly Tradition,and the Supreme Court, 84 HAyv. L. Rlv. 769,
770 (1971). See White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279 (1973) [hereinafter cited as White].
2. See, e.g., A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANaERous BRANCH (1962) [hereinafter cited
as BicxEL, THE LEAsr DANG.EROUS BRANcH]; A. Bic :L, PoLrrcs AND THE WARREN
COURT (1965) [hereinafter cited as BIcKEL PoLrTcs AND TE WARREN CouRT]; A.
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Warren Court, and their criticisms were wide-ranging, the Court also

had its staunch defenders, including an ex-member.3

This essay will

concentrate upon the careers of four men, Paul Freund, Herbert
Wechsler, Philip Kurland, and Alexander Bickel, who were the most
eminent and in many ways the most representative of the Court's commentators. Despite their differences, they shared two significant characteristics: an impulse to warn the Warren Court that it should respect
certain limitations upon its expansive judicial role, and a subsequent
failure to hold the Burger Court to the same professed standards.

H.
A.

Commentators

The Tenor of the Criticism and its Sources

In order to understand whether critical judgment lapsed after the
demise of the Warren Court and, if so, why and how it occurred, we
must first ascertain whether the Warren critics should have continued
to be disturbed during the Burger years. The four major critics of the
Warren Court appeared most upset by the Court's inability to formulate
principled and convincing reasons for its decisions, to deal adequately
with apparently contradictory precedents, and to pay sufficient respect
to the views of dissenting brethren." Thus, they consistently faulted
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970) [hereinafter cited as
BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS].
3. A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1971); G. ScHuBERT, THE CONsTrrToNAL POLITY (1970); A. Cox, THE WARREN
COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968); A. LuwIs,
GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964); Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Teleophase of

Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT. REVIEW 39.
4. The classic statement of this critique is to be found in Bickel & Wellington,

'-

Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REV.
1 (1957). "The Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders
that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the a'uthorities they cite and the results
they decree." Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
Two years later, Professor Kurland cited this statement favorably in an attack on
the Warren Court and added that "recently we have had too many opinions which obfuscate rather than enlighten." Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics, 6
UTAH L. Ruv. 457, 464 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Kurland, The Supreme Court and
its Judicial Critics]. Five years later Kurland stated that "[tlhe Court disregards
precedents at will without offering adequate reasons for change." Kurland, The Court
of the Union or Julius Caesar Revised, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 636, 640 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Kurland, The Court of the Union]. Later still he lamented that
"some of [the Warren Court's] major opinions have been patently disingenuous. It has
distinguished precedents on the flimsiest of grounds and frequently ignored those that
it would not bother to distinguish." P. KuRL tN, PoLITICs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
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the Court for its inadequate "craftsmanship." 5 When critics of the critics sought to meet them on that ground, the former were attacked for
writing better opinions than the Court itself could formulate.6
The "craftsmanship" issue was first raised by Wechsler in his 1959
Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School.7 Although Wechsler was not
as consistent a Court analyst or critic as the others, his 1959 foray is
important for several reasons: it colored the course of the great legal
debate of the 1960's; it conceded that the Supreme Court has great
power in our society; and it enunciated a certain apprehension about
the reaction of Congress or an outraged public to perceived abuse of
the Court's power. These themes also influenced the thinking of
Wechsler's academic colleagues for the next decade. The lecture was
significant for two other reasons: it was published at the height of a
concerted congressional attack upon the Court and it warned the Court
that it should give persuasive, principled reasons for its decisions in race
relations cases. The lecture cannot be regarded as an abstract discourse on the nature of the Supreme Court's function in our society;
rather, it must be viewed in its context, as a plea to all-the Court and
its legion of critics-to restore social and political peace in a time of
trouble.8
In perspective, Wechsler's plea for "neutral principles" is also important for its recognition of the historical dimension of the Court's role,
which many of his colleagues ignored. He not only concentrated his
THE WARREN COURT xxii

(1970) [hereinafter cited as

KURLAND, POLrrICS, THE CONSTI-

TUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT].

Advocates of "Reasoned Elaboration . . . demanded, first, that judges give reasons
for their decisions; second, that the reasons be set forth in a detailed and coherent manner; third, that they exemplify . . . 'the maturing of collective thought'. . . ." White,
supra note 1, at 286. See also Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HAv. L
REV.84 (1959); Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARv. L.REV. 63 (1968).
5. See note 4 supra. For criticism of particular decisions, see BICKEL, THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS, supra note 2, at 63-65; KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 34-35.
6. See BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 2, at 66-70; KURL.AND, POLITICs,
THE CONsTrrUrTiON, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 72, 150-52; H. WECHSLER,
PRINcIPLES, POLITIcS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw, at xiv-xv (1961) [hereinafter cited as
WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW]; Kurland, Book Review, 37

GEo. L.J. 653-54 (1949).
7. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAv.L. REv.
1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles].
8. See also WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW, supra note
6. "Are there, indeed, any criteria that both the Supreme Court and those who undertake to praise or condemn its judgments are morally and intellectually obligated to support?... I am right to state the question as the same one for the Court and for its
critics." Id. at 15-16.
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analysis upon race cases, but carefully chose to scrutinize three-the
Texas white primary case,' Shelley v. Kraemer,'0 and Brown v. Board
of Education"--eachof which had been decided by a differently constituted Court. The lecture recognized that constitutional doctrine was
developing in the race relations area, that this development was presenting certain logical problems, and that future development, while
necessary, should be more orderly. Wechsler believed "craftsmanship" would assure orderly development; but it also served the political
function of a rejoinder to those charging judicial usurpation. The dichotomy between principle as a value in itself and as a defense against
lay critics thus became evident both explicitly and implicitly in Wechsler's work. This dichotomy was also to become important to Bickel,
Kurland, and Freund as the Warren Court moved into newer and even
more controversial areas.
The emphasis on "craftsmanship" created significant problems for
the critics. For instance, Wechsler argued that the Court was essentially a court of law and, accordingly, was required to decide all properly presented cases without evasion, once the requisite neutral principles were satisfactorily established. 12 All of the other major critics believed that the Court was also a policy making organ of government,
but that, as an undemocratic body, the Court should not make too much
policy, especially in areas that confounded the judgment of other policy
making bodies such as Congress. Once the role of the Court was expanded to include such statesmanlike functions, it became difficult to
delineate any limitations. General admonitions of judicial self-restraint
were not helpful, especially since each of the critics had his own preferred areas of judicial activism.' 3 In addition, some of the restraining
techniques urged by the critics raised logical questions of their own.' 4
9. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles,supra note 7, at 6.
13. See, e.g., note 140 infra.
14. Professor Gunther commented on Bickel's fondness for endorsing the use of
"avoidance devices," such as summary denials or dismissals of appeals that are within
the Court's mandatory jurisdiction: "A summary disposition .. .does not mean that
the Court has avoided adjudication" for it is still a "decision on the merits." Gunther,
The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency
in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 11 (1964). Gunther is not impressed with
Bickel's admonition that "the Court need not and should not listen when Congress exercises its constitutional authority under Article III" to give the Court mandatory jurisdiction. Id. at 12. Because for Gunther principles "are principle[s] no less so because
they pertain to jurisdiction," Bickel's creation of the term "jurisdictional" dismissal "appears to have no basis in the Constitution." Id. at 15. Gunther's conclusion is that
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To complicate matters even further, the critics split on the issue
of the Court's mandate. Within the framework of judicial restraint,
upon which they agreed, there were substantial conceptual differences

about the proper role of the Court. The problem was epitomized by
Justice Frankfurter, the critics' patron saint, whose notions of Fourteenth Amendment due process in criminal cases permitted him to reject the exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence in Wolf v. Colorado,5 to apply it rather arbitrarily in Rochin v. California'6 three years

later, and to protest vigorously the majority's refusal to extend the rule
two years later in Irvine v. California.'7
If the quandary between the Court's circumspect legal role and
its statesmanlike function could not be readily resolved, the very formulation of the rational elaboration doctrine'8 could serve the useful func-

tion of permitting discretionary attack upon particular decisions disfavored by the critics. "Craftsmanship" is, of course, one of those laudable principles that has been attained only rarely in great cases.' 9 The
"Bickel's 'virtues' are 'passive' in name and appearance only: a virulent variety of freewheeling interventionism lies at the core of his devices of restraint." Id. at 25. The
critics' propensity to judge the Court by standards of "popularity" and "craftsmanship"
allowed leeway for ad hoc criticism. "When . . . success by every practical test-compliance, popular acceptance, respect for the institution of the Court is achieved by a
decision that purports to be based on broad constitutional principle, realist critics will
grumble about judicial method." Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82
YALEL.J. 227, 243 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Linde]. Bickel's preference for indirect
judicial disapproval of disfavored policy decisions by other branches of government without constitutional invalidation did not fool one critic, who observed that "a sufficiently
prolonged series of invalidations on nonconstitutional grounds might well be perceived
as an attempt to implement an unspoken constitutional judgment." Deutsch, Neutrality,
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and PoliticalScience, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 207 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Deutsch]. He also found
no real distinction between Bickel's approval of dismissals on appeal without opinion and
his disapproval of per curiam decision-making, since the latter also functions as a "mediating device." Id. at 221.
15. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
16. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Justice Frankfurter noted that Rochin involved a situation that "shockted his] conscience." Id. at 172.
17. 347 U.S. 128, 142 (1954).
18. Linde, supra note 14, at 243. When the Court "looks to the past decade's most
prominent academic criticism, it will often find little there to distinguish it from the popular. Disagreements with the chain of inference by which the Court got from the Constitution to its result, if mentioned at all, have tended to be announced in the most conclusory terms, and the impression has often been left that the real quarrel of the
Academy, like that of the laity, is with the results the Court has been reaching and perhaps with judicial 'activism' in general." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 944 (1973).
19. Freund commented on the Marshall Court's tendency to pronounce doctrines
whose "momentum... shot beyond its mark" in decisions like McCullouch v. Mary-
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critics recognized that the Supreme Court is a consensual body and that
opinions are constructed to reflect the diverse perspectives of a majority
of the justices. Under the aegis of Marshall, who controlled his court
as no other chief justice has since, a unified, compelling work product
could usually be produced. Absent such a towering figure, consistency
is almost impossible to achieve. This was especially true of the Warren
Court, for the chief justice served with two "great" associates and five
"near great" associates, men with strong attitudes and perspectives.20
Marshall, in contrast, led a Court which included only one "great' and
one "near great" colleague. 2 '
If the plea for craftsmanship was capable of misuse, there is strong
evidence that, for some critics the plea served to cloak disagreements
with the substantive decisions of the Warren Court. This is not to suggest that the process of transforming procedural disagreements into
substantive criticisms is merely pretext. Indeed, the transformation
may well be unconscious. While Freund and Wechsler seemed to
grow accustomed to the activism of the Warren Court in the later sixties, Kurland and Bickel found that the Court was doing too much. Indeed, as the Warren Court ended, Kurland and Bickel believed that
the Court was doing not only too much but also too much of the wrong
thing. The Court's activities were encouraging various dissident
groups that were threatening the fragile social and political consensus
upon which the Republic rested. While Bickel based his criticism upon
the presence of too much "principle" and a concomitant absence of accommodation, Kurland inveighed against what he believed to be the
particular animating attitude of the Court, egalitarianism.2 2 As Kurland and Bickel protested the perceived goals of the Warren Court,
land, 18 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824). Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 631, 639
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law]. Kurland,
though not discussing specifics, said of the Marshall Court: "The contribution ... to
the survival of one indivisible nation cannot be gainsaid. Yet, one might 'describe' ...
the achievement of the Marshall Court in less than glorious terms." KURLAND, POLmCS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 10.
20. Black and Frankfurter were rated as "great" justices by sixty-five scholars in
1970; Douglas, Jackson, Harlan, Brennan, and Fortas earned the "near great" sobriquet.
See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 289 (1974).
21. Story was the only "great" justice and William Johnson the only "near great"
Marshall colleague. Id.
22. Kurland saw the Warren Court as a major contributor to the "egalitarian ethos
that is becoming dominant in our society."
THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at xx.

KURLAND, PoLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
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their tone changed from genteel querulousness 24to outright hostility. 23
The change was apparent to some of their critics.
Tone must be distinguished from rhetoric, and the latter was generally couched in terms of craftsmanship. Issues of craftsmanship ostensibly can be debated without reference to partisan politics. Presumably, one need not have an ax to grind in order to argue that the
Court was not stating reasons but was substituting ipse dixits for rational
elaboration, or that it was misstating the clear meaning of precedents
to arrive at foreordained results, or misusing history, or failing to meet
reasoned dissent. 25 The middle-of-the-road commentators often
adopted this formulation of the critical postulate, but stood apart from
26
any general attitude of hostility toward the Court's mission.
In order to trace the growth of such hostility among scholars such
as Kurland and Bickel, and to distinguish it from the benign acceptance
by Freund and Wechsler, it is necessary to explore carefully the writings of both sets of critics. Only then can one glean some indication
of what bothered them, why they became increasingly alarmed, and
why their critical stances seemed suspended in the first half-decade of
the seventies. Before analyzing the differences between Bickel and
Kurland, on the one side, and Freund and Wechsler on the other, it
is necessary to analyze their commonalities. Those commonalities,
which initially served to unite them, were insufficient bonds during the
sixties, but were strong enough to reunite them in a brotherhood of
acquiescence in the seventies.
Their commonalities are fairly clear. They were all deeply immersed in the Brandeis-Frankfurter tradition of judicial restraint.
Freund and Wechsler had clerked for Justice Brandeis and studied
under Frankfurter at Harvard Law School. Frankfurter and Brandeis
were the bearers of a tradition, a tradition exemplified by James Bradley Thayer, Thomas Reed Powell, and, overwhelmingly, by Oliver
Wendell Holmes. When Frankfurter joined the Court, he was -served
by Kurland and Bickel as law clerks. They viewed themselves as exponents of a tradition. The tradition was in large part a contradictory
23. See text accompanying notes 179-82, 193-94, 225-28, 258-60, 296-301, 44043,
464-70 infra.
24. "Over time, the tone of commentators' analyses had gradually shifted from one
that marks the explications of the critic to one more characteristic of the strictures of
the opponent." Deutsch, supra note 14, at 169, 204.
25. This is the gravamen of Leonard Levy's criticism of both the Warren and the
Burger Courts. L Lvy, AINST THE LAW 438 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LEVY].'
26. Id.

C-
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one, for it espoused judicial humility and deference to the democratic
process while recognizing that courts do make, rather than find, law.
To reconcile the contradiction the doctrine of judicial self-discipline

was invoked. Thus, legal realism, by its very postulate, required of
the Supreme Court a high degree of statesmanship.28

Experience also contributed to the perceived need for statesmanship. To the exponents of self-restraint the ultimate term of opprobrium was "Lochneresque. ' 29 They believed that the substitution of
judicially determined values from a silent or ambiguous Constitution
should not operate to subvert legislatively decreed choices. As Freund
once noted, "[tihe performance of the Supreme Court in the 1920's

and early 1930's has had a decisive effect on our thinking about the
process of constitutional adjudication."30 That performance consisted
of the Court imposing its own values while striking down those of the
people and their elected representatives. Judicial review, itself an
27. "For the Progressive realists, the Constitution was not a catechism, and the
judges were not priests reciting it. They demanded of the judges an understanding 'of
the great industrial and political problems now before us' and 'sympathy with the big
movements which have for their aim the promotion of the public welfare."' BIcKEL,
Th- IDEA OF PROORESS, supra note 2, at 19-20.
28. "Mhe new style . . . could . . . bring a new substance in its train. And the
upshot would be conflict with political democracy, which was a strongly-held tenet of
the Progressive realists, and with the pragmatic skepticism that was also part of their
intellectual make-up. . . . [T]hey all . . . put great store by political democracy." Id.
at 22. The statesmanship theme recurs throughout Bickel's book, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS. "The Court in Constitutional adjudication faces what must
surely be the largest and the hardest task of principled decision-making faced by any
group of men in the entire world." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles,supra note 7,
at 20. It has animated the writings of Philip Kurland as well. Thus "strength of character" and "intellectual power" are necessary "if a Supreme Court Justice is to have that
breadth of vision, that capacity for disinterested judgment which the task demands." P.
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT,

supra note 4, at xxv.

He has constantly stressed the overwhelming need for a "sole determinant" of eligibility
for nomination to the court, "a breadth of capacity as tested in the crucible of experience" as a statesman. Kurland, The Appointment -and Disappointment of Supreme
Court Justices, 1972 LAw & Soc. ORDER 183, 197 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kurland,
Appointment and Disappointment]. "The function of the Supreme Court Justice is governance and the best test of capacity for that office is experience in governance." Id.
at 198. Kurland has found that most justices have abysmally failed his test. See note
177 infra.
29. See A. BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 2, at 21, 25, discussing
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner "has probably received more
nearly unanimous criticism than any other [decision] in the twentieth century .. . "
R. McCLosKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 279 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McCLOSKEY].
30. Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 467
(1967).
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anomaly in a democratic society, was always reluctantly accepted by the
critics; they felt it would cease to command the approval of the Ameri-

can people if it were permitted to run wild."1 Indeed, Wechsler's 1959
Holmes lecture was commonly regarded as-and Wechsler admitted
this-an answer to Learned Hand's Holmes lecture of the previous year
which questioned judicial review and the legal meaning of the Bill of
Rights.3" Wechsler, who disagreed with Judge Hand on both counts,
advocated judicial self-restraint by recognition of general and neutral

principles, while the others, admitting that such self-restraint was difficult if not impossible, argued for what Bickel came to call "the passive
virtues.""3
Another commonality was a tradition of hero worship. All of the

scholars analyzed herein were unabashed and self-confessed hero worshippers.3 4

Bickel and Kurland revered Frankfurter; Freund and

31. To Kurland, in 1970, "[tuhe sword of Damocles hangs over the Court by the
thin thread, today a gossamer thread, of public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary." KURLAND, PoLmcs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WAEN COURT, supra note 4,
at xxiii. To Bickel, the contest between the Court and the Congress in 1937 proved
that the Court, if it persists in thwarting the majority, must ultimately be the loser.
BICKEL, TuE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 93. "The court is a leader
of opinion, not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its
own; and-the short of it-it labors under the obligation to succeed." Id. at 239. Three
years later, he spoke of the "insulated, unrepresentative Court." BIcKEL, PoLmcs AND
THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2, at 12.
32. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles,supra note 7, at 1-5.
33. See BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGROTUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 49-65, 124-25,
200.
34. Kurland's affection for Jerome N. Frank, for whom he first clerked, was that
of "a self-confessed hero-worshipper." Kurland, Jerome N. Frank: Some Reflections
and Recollections of a Law Clerk, 24 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 661, 663 (1957). Notwithstanding his devotion to Judge Frank, Kurland observed that "Cardozo's writing was pellucid
and certainly better understood by students and lawyers than the cryptics of Holmes or
the jargon of the psychologists whom [Judge Frank] quoted so freely." Id. at 662. For
Kurland, the realist tradition became a disenchantment with the social sciences and a
reverence for pellucid authority. That reverence was not confined to Justice Cardozo;
he wrote of Justice Frankfurter in 1965: "For his epigones, like their master, are necessarily mortal, and the unique experience of having known FF is not transferable." Kurland, Felix Frankfurter, 51 VA. L. REv. 562 (1965). Alexander Bickel said of Justice
Frankfurter: "He was a hero-worshipper who transformed all those he worshipped into
real heroes." Bickel, Felix Frankfurter,78 HARv. L. Rv. 1527, 1528 (1965). According to Bickel, Justice Frankfurter was not frightened by anything--"not... the might
of America's foreign enemies or, in the Thirties and Fifties, the menace of her domestic
ones." Id. at 1528. Bickel revered Frankfurter for his abilities as a great teacher and
moral exemplar. "[He served human liberty. He would attempt to build few protective shields around it, but strove to secure justice, to educate men, and to cause them
to seek and enrich their freedom." Id.
Freund characterized Justice Brandeis as "a master with whom I served an apprenticeship ... ." Freund, The Supreme Court: A Tale of Two Terms, 26 OHIo ST. L.
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Wechsler, representing a somewhat older generation, revered Brandeis.
One could argue that an attitude of hero worship constitutes a part of
the ideological in-breeding of law school.3 5 The case law method of
225 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Freund, A Tale of Two Terms]. This description may
unintentionally reveal more than mere idolatry, for in an apprenticeship the master directs the student in certain techniques of craftsmanship and the student then adheres
to them, attempting to emulate the master. Such an interpretation is misleading, however, given Freund's later development. Freund may be better characterized by his own
tribute to Justice 'Frankfurter, which, while enthusiastic, took issue with the Justice's
overreliance on history: "But when history is called on to furnish a guide to the priority
of values, I wonder whether it is being given a burden heavier than it can bear alone."
Freund, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,26 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 205, 214 (1959).
35. John Noonan has recently observed: "Legal education has often been education in the making and unmaking of persons." J.NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE
LAw 58 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NOONAN]. Although he was referring to the
tendency of legal education to deal with people in terms of what they "contributed" to
the development of soulless legal rules, others have spoken about the capacity of legal
education to dehumanize its students, especially its best students: "Students trained under the Langdell system are like future horticulturists confining their studies to cut flowers, like architects who study pictures of buildings and nothing else. They resemble prospective dog breeders who never see anything but stuffed dogs. And it is beginning to
be suspected that there is some correlation between that kind of stuffed dog study and
the over-production of stuffed shirts in the legal profession." Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. Rnv. 907, 912 (1933).
Alan A. Stone, a psychiatrist who served on the Harvard Law School faculty for
several years, reiterated the point that law school education stresses the acquisition of
"virtue through understanding" and the development of a "vision of morality" through
"analytic skill." Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. Rnv. 392, 394-95
(1971). His article concentrated on the law professor: "The background of law professors is strikingly homogeneous; almost all were law review, many clerked for Supreme
Court Justices or other notable judges, and almost all are brilliant, at least in their capacity for legal analysis. . . . They have internalized a legal standard of perfection . .. ..
Id. at 403. Because of their "need to be invulnerable" to criticism, they play the role of
"the omnipotent and destructive critic as one premise after another falls before [their]
arguments." Id. at 404, 411. This creates in the students an "extraordinarily deferential attitude" and "gratitude for any personal interest." Id. at 412. Law review students
become more aggressive and identify "with the aggressor-the professor." Id. at 422.
Willard Hurst found that the Langdell case method was a limited, "static, taxonomic approach to law. The principles . . . were principles d6fined by tests of logic, by which
one could handily classify the otherwise unruly body of case material." Hurst, Lawyers
in American Society 1750-1966, 50 MARQ. L. R1v. 594, 603 (1967). Thomas Bergin
found law teachers to possess "extraordinary scholarly skills . . .at rule preaching and
case parsing" and to be expert at "rule-mongering." Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man
Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637, 645, 655 (1968). See also Kennedy, The
Law Review Priesthood 1 LEARNING AND rm LAw 61 (Winter, 1975); Zaremski, The
First Year in Law School: The Intention is to Make You Feel Less Than a Human
Being, 1 LEARNING AND THE LAw 51 (Summer, 1974). The term "formalist" could be
readily applied to those "rule-mongerers"; formalism stresses the "ruthless desire to analyze the law rigorously in terms of a few fundamental principles" and a "'logical,' 'mechanical,' or 'fundamentalist' method of judicial decision." Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE LJ. 1153, 1161 (1970). The metaphor of a constantly growing
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instruction breeds reverence for and symbolic attachment to the past. 36
Perhaps that attitude helps to explain a curious anomaly in the critics'

position. Prior to Chief Justice Warren's tenure they had little to say
about the general direction of the Court. Their reticence may have been

based on a scholarly deference to Justice Frankfurter, who dominated the
Court during Chief Justice Vinson's tenure. Although Bickel was
clerking for Justice Frankfurter in 1952, the others were already established academics during the Vinson era. Kurland, for instance, managed the considerable feat of reviewing a book about the Court's views

on civil liberties without commenting upon those attitudes or indeed
mentioning any cases. 3 ' The others were as quiescent about the
Court's activities during that period as they have been about the activi-

Court, a body that bears some resemblance to the
ties of the Burger
8
Court.
1947-54
Another important value to the Warren Court critics was federalism. In 1954, Wechsler wrote that "in a far flung, free society, the
federalist values are enduring," and that such values are the "sole alter-

native to tyranny." 39 Freund, speaking at the same symposium, found
body of law was attacked in Ritchie, Education for Professional Responsibility, 50
MARQ. L. REv. 627, 628 (1967). Noonan observed that "taken for granted in all of
these metaphors of growth is the continuity and directedness of doctrinal change."
NooNAN, supra at 153. Yet the very formulations of the metaphor and its analogy to
nature are incorrect, for "the processes of the earth suggest cycles, not interrupted
growth. The metaphors based on human development point to old age and death." Id.
at 154.
36. See generally NooNAN, supra note 35. He asserts that "rules cannot be the
sole or principal object of legal study, legal history, and legal philosophy without distortion. What is distorted is the place of persons in the process.. . ." Id. at 17. Noonan
criticizes both Justice Holmes and Justice Cardozo for their opinions resolving cases
against the interests of justice. He found that Justice Holmes, in American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), had rendered an unjust decision based upon
a belief that "[iun the contest for survival, the strongest force prevails, and it is not
a judge's business to be tenderhearted to the vanquished or the maimed." NooNAN, supra at 70. He also found that Cardozo's decision in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), had ignored justice to the litigants in favor of severe
impartiality and strict interpretation of the law of causation in tort. NOONAN, supra at
139-144.
37. Kurland, Book Review, 22 U. Cu. L. Rnv. 297 (1954).
38. See text accompanying notes 333-40 infra.
39. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Union, 54 COLUM. L. Rnv. 543 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism]. "National action has thus always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justi.
fied by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." Id. at 544. It is
difficult to ascertain from his tone whether Wechsler approved of the fact that in 1951
Congress refused to require equal congressional population districting, despite the recommendations of President Truman and a committee of the American Political Science As-
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at least a potential truth in the observation of Karl Loewenstein that
"[a] state with a federal income tax is no longer a genuinely federal
state. ' 40 Also, Freund justified the Civil Rights Cases41 in terms of
a viable federalism: "[Tihe Civil Rights Cases . . . reflected the sen-

of the upheaval produced
timent that reunion called for a 4mitigation
2
legislation.
by the Reconstruction
As early as 1958, the decline of federalism was apparent to Kurland. "Some of the causes of the deterioration of state governments . . .
are obviously irreversible, 4 3 he noted, while decrying "the inability or
unwillingness of the states to deal with the problems which are properly
theirs." 44 Kurland also deplored the "lack of capacity and a corruption
of state officials which have too often been the hallmarks of state and

local governments.

'5

Despite this indictment, he still believed that

the states were the only bulwark against governmental tyranny over the

individual. Although the Court was right in denying the states certain
' such as the maintenance of segregated school sys"illegitimate ends," 46
tems, Kurland concluded that it had a higher duty, to protect the states
from federal power, and that at this it had historically failed.47

Despite Wechsler's belief that federalism was the "sole alternative
to tyranny" 48 and the dedication of the other critics to federalism both

as an enduring constitutional principle and as a means for circumscribing the growth of the central government and its inevitable threat to
the individual, they all placed a high priority upon civil liberties.

-

In

sociation. Id. at 551-52. Malapportionment of the House of Representatives explained
"why presidential programs calling for the extension of national activity, and seemingly
supported by the country in a presidential election, may come a cropper notwithstanding
in the House." Id. at 552.
40. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 CoLum. L. Rnv. 561, 563 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Freund, Umpiring the FederalSystem].
41. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
42. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, supra note 40, at 564. He warned that
"Erleview by the supreme tribunal ought not be precipitate." Id. at 575.
43. Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of State Power, 10 STAN. L.
REV. 274, 282 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kurland, The Attrition of State Power].
44. Id.
45. Id. at 283.
46. Id. at 284.
47. In Lochner, the "old" Supreme Court had state power; "[tlo the states, therefore, was never returned fully the powers of which the Court has deprived them." Id.
at 285. Neither Wechsler nor Freund was as pessimistic as Kurland. Freund believed
that the Warren Court's federalism decisions would be "more apt to center on cementing
the states by measures short of congressional occupation of the field." Freund, Law and
the Future: ConstitutionalLaw, 51 Nw. U.L. Rv. 187, 192 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Freund, Law and the Future].
48. Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism,supra note 39, at 543.
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line with Frankfurter's decisions in cases such as McNabb v. United
States4 9 and Mallory v. United States,50 which limited the power of the
District of Columbia police to extract confessions during periods of unreasonable detention, his academic votaries believed that the Court had
a legitimate role in protecting the Bill of Rights. Whether this stance
was due to Frankfurter's endorsement of activism in this area or to the
theory that the essential guarantees of the Bill of Rights were thought
of as procedural and thus capable of being supervised by the Court,
is irrelevant. Until the end of the Warren period, the major critics substantially endorsed the Court's civil liberties decisions.
Alexander Bickel, for example, was not uneasy about the Warren
Court's protectionist decisions in the field of criminal justice. He was
satisfied with distinguishing between procedural and substantive decisions and argued that procedural decisions deal primarily with the
"how" of governmental action, while substantive decisions deal with the
"what."5 1 In fact, procedural decisions were, to him, exceptions to the
necessity for judicial invocation of the "passive virtues. ' 52 "Procedural
decisions are consequently less affected by principles of limitation on
the exercise of the judicial function, less affected by considerations of
restraint."53 In analyzing the balance between social needs and individual freedom subsequent to Escobedo v. Illinois,54 Bickel anticipated
the basic premise of Miranda v. Arizona5 5 by noting that "prolonged
interrogation in the [atmosphere] of a police station has a tendency
to coerce, even in the scrupulous absence of any overt coercion, physical or psychological." 50 Of lawyerless police interrogation practices,
Bickel could grimly ask, "How do we square with our professed principles a practice whose professed purpose is to defeat those [constitutionally
guaranteed] principles?"5 7 A supplementary inquiry was, "Should
friendless, indigent defendants be supplied with counsel in the station
house? That is the burning question."58 According to Bickel's moderate position, the defendant or suspect should be warned of his right
49. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

50. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
51. Bickel, Judicial Review of Police Methods Law Enforcement-The Role of the
Supreme Court of the United States, 44 TExAs L. REv. 954, 955 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Bickel, JudicialReview of Police Methods].
52. See text accompanying notes 287-91 infra.
53. Bickel, JudicialReview of Police Methods, supra note 51, at 955.
54. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. Bickel, JudicialReview of Police Methods, supra note 51, at 959.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 960.
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to counsel and of his right not to speak at presentation to the magistrate.5 9 Again, anticipating Miranda, he argued for warnings "during
any period that is recognizably custodial," 0 regardless of location and
circumstance.
Freund essentially adopted Bickels' substance-procedure distinction. For instance, in 1963, after acknowledging that the Court had
' he found that "[i]t
accepted the "essential powers of government,"61
is in the realm of procedure that the Court has now been more insistent."62 As government's power, authority, and activities expanded
substantively, Bickel argued that the courts became the "special guardians of legal procedures, of the standards of decency and fair play that
should be the counterpoise to the extensive affirmative powers of government." 63 Because he believed that "governmental intervention in
our personal concerns" 64 would not decrease, he thought that the threat
to liberty would escalate, as would the necessity to combat that threat
judicially.es

Another common perception about the Supreme Court, one which
preceded the Warren Court, was that it was overworked. Concern
over the Court's willingness to assume great and inappropriate burdens
runs throughout the critical literature66 and constitutes the backdrop for
59. Id. "Well, if a corollary of the right to stand mute is, for the rich, the right
to be advised by counsel, then it must be the more so for the poor, who are more easily
intimidated and need counsel worse." Id. Earlier that year, in commenting upon a District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision, he observed that "counsel should be made
available ... in the station house" and thought it an "excellent suggestion" to videotape
all police interrogations. Bickel, After the Arrest, NEw RPrBunc, February 12, 1966,
at 16.
60. Bickel, JudicialReview of Police Methods, supra note 51, at 961.
61. Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, 25 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1, 5 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id. at 6. It was essential to Freund that "big" government be responsible government; to insure that Leviathan was representative, "it [was] not hard to appreciate
the central importance of the [Warren Court] decisions on freedom of [the] press and
assembly on voting rights, and on reapportionment." Id. This was not the common
critical view, and Freund himself modified it somewhat after 1964, at least insofar as
reapportionment was concerned. See Freund, A Tale of Two Terms, supra note 34.
66. In 1958, Kurland wrote that "the Court grants too many petitions for certiorari
rather than too few," and found that during the 1956 term the 132 cases decided with
opinion were simply too many. Kurland, The Attrition of State Power, supra note 43,
at 277. Interestingly, Freund noted seven years later that more cases were decided with
opinion in the 1932 term than in the 1963 term. Freund, A Tale of Two Terms, supra
note 34, at 229. Henry Hart, Freund's predecessor as law clerk for Brandeis, had formulated the classic attack on the Court's workload in Foreword: The Time Chart of the
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the role of the critics in the seventies.

7

The function of the Court

was to "maintain the majesty of the law," said Kurland. 8

For Freund,

the task of the Court was to enunciate the great principles of federal-

ism."" This task requires the taking of fewer cases and some relief
from the crushing burdens of considering a flood of petitions for certiorari, and would allow more painstaking deliberation and agreement

in the critical cases taken and decided.7 0 In the early years of the Warren Court, Freund actually praised the court for not deciding too many
cases:
If the Court carries through its present tendency to curtail the number of argued cases and full opinions, there will be greater opportunity for reflection, systematization, consensus, and, it is to be
hoped, for the educational function which lawyer-philosophers disJustices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959). Both Hart and Kurland attacked the Court's propensity to take Federal Employer Liability Act cases involving trivial questions. Id. at
96; Kurland, The Attrition of State Power, supra note 43, at 289. Some insight into
the fact that law is not free from politics, even on tangential issues such as "caseload,"
and that Supreme Court justices use their former clerks and students to lobby for their
views may be found in the recently published writings of Hugo Black, Jr., about his
father and Felix Frankfurter: "A Justice who disagreed with FF might well expect an
article critical of his position to appear in a law journal, and, strangely enough, the language might tend to resemble the very language FF had used in a private conference
in which he had sought to bring the Justice around.
"FF always felt strongly that the Supreme Court should limit its attention to important matters of state, and believed that the Court was accepting and reversing too many
cases where a judge had taken away by post-trial order a jury verdict in favor of, say,
an injured railroad worker under the. . . F.E.L.A. Hugo was the moving force behind
this practice. When FF could not bring about its end, he cast his argument in other
terms. He concluded that the Court was overworked largely because of the acceptance
of such matters as the F.E.L.A. cases and presented statistics to back up his demand
that the situation be remedied. Shortly thereafter, an eminent scholar published an article in the HarvardLaw Journal [sic] which concluded that the Supreme Court was overworked and presented statistics remarkably like those that had been cited by Justice
Frankfurter. FF brought the article down to Daddy and said, 'You see, Hugo, I am
not the only one who feels the Court is overworked.'
"Daddy smiled. 'Felix, don't you think I know where that article came from?'"
H. BLACK, MY FATHER: A

REMEMBRANCE,

226-27 (1975).

67. Kurland in 1970 hoped that the new Court would recognize that it was overworked and that it should attempt to stem the "deterioration" in opinion writing. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, 1970 Sup. CT. REview 1, 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Kurland, Enter the Burger Court].
68. Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971
Sup. Cr. REVIEW 265, 322 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kurland, 1970 Term]. For
Bickel's view, see note 325 infra.
69. Freund, Umpiring the FederalSystem, supra note 40, at 578.
70. See generally Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59
A.B.A.J. 247 (1973).
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charge when as judges they pronounce the law of the Constitution. 71
It must be noted that the view of the Court as an imperial body
consecrated to the enunciation of national law was in fundamental conflict with yet another critical function, its role as protector of "the individual against the incursions of the Leviathan.""' 2 Those words come
not from the pen of an Arthur Goldberg or an Archibald Cox but were
written by Philip Kurland. According to Kurland, "The Court may
well be the last governmental bulwark of freedom as well as the schoolmaster of the nation. '' 73 Clearly, a court concerned with broad enunciations is a different body from one grubbing about in the tawdry facts
of a criminal prosecution, or a local free speech case. The critics never
resolved the conundrum, although for Kurland at least, the values of
federalism clearly limited the second role of the Court. He chided
the Warren Court for setting itself up as the "supervisor of the administration of criminal justice, for the state courts no less than for the
' 4
federal."
The critics also shared a common approbation of the activity of
the early Warren Court. They found its early record circumspect, except, of course, in Brown v. Board of Education,75 a decision that was
regarded as a moral imperative. Yet, one cannot help but believe that
the critics, especially Bickel and Kurland, misinterpreted that Court.
They may have been misled by appearances because the early Warren
Court did not seem to be particularly radical. For instance, Robert McCloskey depicted the 1955 Term as exemplifying a "Court alive to values such as federalism, but equally alive to the need for protecting and
extending the range of individual justice in a world that has recently
seen that ideal so gravely challenged.""76 None of the major decisions,
including the semicontroversial ones in Pennsylvania v. Nelson" and
71. Freund, Law and the Future, supra note 47, at 191.
72. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 321.
73. Id. Although he attacked judicial "activism," he did argue that the Court
"must be free to consider constitutional questions as "constantly open for decision." He
cautioned, however, that "this country must [not] be burdened with ill-considered or inappropriate constitutional law." Kurland, The Attrition o fState Power, supra note 43,
at 278-79. He also disagreed with the proposition that "the Courts have no role in aiding the transitions that are demanded by the ever changing conditions of society." Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 344.
74. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, supra note 67, at 24.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. MCCLoSKEY, supra note 29, at 141.
77. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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Slochower v. Board of Higher Education,7 should have alarmed anyone. 79 Indeed, the Court adopted a "policy of non-substantive scrutiny"
which was a "triumph for Justice Frankfurter.""0 The Court had almost

struck a balance between a body that "abdicates" and "one that rules
too strictly," and that balance was consistent with "the American politi-

cal tradition." 8' The rulings of the 1956 term, which eventually led
to a congressional onslaught against the Court, still did not evidence
the onset of a judicial revolution. Although there were hints that a
"future period of fullscale judicial activism" might be in the offing, McCloskey couldn't be sure. a2 The decisions in Watkins v. United
States,8 3 Jencks v. United States, 4 and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,5 which so upset Congress, were exaggerated by the Court's de-

tractors and clearly represented only a minimal exercise of restraint
upon Congress and the states in the interests of fair play.8 6 McCloskey
found even Justice Brennan's decision in Roth v. United States8" to en-

dorse "a rather wide latitude for [the] suppression of literature.""8 War78. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
79. See McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 143-56.
80. Id. at 154. There was a "tendency to confront the smaller questions rather
than the larger in each .. . . [Bjut the net effect is to cast the Court's weight on
the side of moderating anti-subversive laws." Id. at 152. The technique of interpretation of statutes rather than confrontation with Congress did not discomfort McCloskey,
who found it "hard to criticize the Court for assuming that Congress was more sensible
than some of the public utterances of its members might indicate, or for requiring it
to speak plainly if it means to endorse those utterances." Id. at 152.
81. "The American political tradition does assume, for better or worse, that the
judiciary will have a hand in guiding the republic, and a Court that abdicates is no more
comportable with that tradition than one that rules too strictly." Id. at 156.
82. Id. at 160.
83. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
84. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
85. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
86. "Congress can still send its committees forth on fishing expeditions, and the
pertinency of its questions for the purposes of compulsory process can be established so
long as it is clear what particular waters are being fished at any given time!" McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 173. "In sum, Watkins and Sweezy, in their strict holdings, leave
the legislature's power to investigate subversion not many millimeters from where they
found it." Id. at 176, citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1956). "Among
all the cases of the 1956 Term dealing with subversion, Jencks . ..probably excited the
greatest public furor for the smallest cause." McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 177, 180.
The unanimous decision in Schware "sounds almost self-evident" and the "flat declaration that freedom of occupation is protected by the 'due process' clause" and the "intimation that the 'privilege doctrine' is no longer available as a defense for arbitrary state
licensing requirements... clears up an old and gaping ambiguity in American constitutional law." Id. at 167.
87. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
88. McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 164.
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ren and Brennan, even as they were being vigorously attacked, stood

"closer to the Frankfurter position than to that of Douglas and Black." 9
Similarly, the 1957 Term gave no cause for alarm, and the judicial
"proponents of the more circumspect course seem[ed] now to have
won the day."90 As late as 1962 the Warren Court still seemed to be
only modestly reacting to Congress. 91 Although the 1960 term was "a
rather dreary one ' in terms of the Court's willingness to challenge
controversial congressional prerogatives, its criminal procedure deci-

sions did indicate greater activism.
During this period, the scholars defended the Court both from its
southern critics and from those who were upset by detractors of the
decisions regarding subversive activity. In a commencement address

at the University of Washington, Freund argued for adherence to the
rule of law, which he defined as the "imposing of order on disorder
while preserving the creative and spontaneous and nonconforming im-

pulses that prevent stagnation in our society. 91 3 He attacked Orville
Faubus, the governor of Arkansas who had attempted to defy the federal courts in the Little Rock desegregation dispute, and found that

Pennsylvania v. Nelson,94 which held that state anti-subversive laws
were preempted by the Smith Act and other federal laws, was defensible: "IThe principle applied by the Court goes back to the decisions
of an eminent Virginian named John Marshall and. . . Congress can

still have the last word by simply making its intention clear."9' 5 Freund
89. Id. at 189.
90. Id. at 204.
91. McCloskey said that the majority opinions in Wilkinson v. United States, 365
U.S. 399 (1961), and Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961), were "marred by
an evasion." McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 226. "To be sure, the balancing formula
[in First Amendment cases such as Wilkinson and Braden] cannot be expected to produce certain and precise results. But we can fairly ask that the users of the test weigh
realities against realities insofar as imperfect man can discern them." Id. "And the
net result of these pronouncements is that congressional committees remain unfettered
by significant constitutional restraints." Id. McCloskey thought that the Court could
have engaged in more interpretation and "at least deferred an outright holding that two
dubious, repressive statutes are sanctioned by the Coxistitution." Id. at 232. 'The Court
is probably going to behave unobtrusively in [subversion cases], but it has not yet
wholly abdicated." Id. at 233.
92. Id. at 237. "Perhaps no other field, except racial discrimination, so clearly illustrates the general concord of the judges on a basic ideal of fairness to the individual"
as did the criminal justice cases; and "the majority has forged gradually ahead." Id.
at 242.
93. Freund, The Rule of Law, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 314, 315 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as Freund, The Rule of Law].
94. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
95. Freund, The Rule of Law, supra note 93, at 316.
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feared a "threat to the judiciary" and the elevation of "supine mediocrities for the Bench" in the face of the concerted attack.96 When irresponsible critics so consistently attacked the Court, the rule of law was
also at stake.97 Kurland, while contending that some of the criticism
was based upon public ignorance, admonished the organized bar to rally
to the defense of the Court.98 In 1962, Bickel collected some of his
earlier essays into a book with a revealing title, The Least Dangerous
Branch.9

Thus, in retrospect, the commonalities of ideology, assumption,
and experience with the Court enabled the critics to unite in its defense, for it had done little by 1960 to warrant censure. Yet, there
was an uneasiness, a cautiousness about that defense. The Court was
getting close to the line of activism; its major decisions of the fifties,
although reasonably principled and generally supported by substantial
majorities of the justices, had created a storm of controversy. The vehemence of lay and congressional discontent about even the modest decisions of the fifties was unnerving to the Court's friends.
When the caution of the Warren Court was replaced in the 1960's
by an activism that energized old congressional enemies, converted new
ones, triggered a positive response from formerly disadvantaged
groups, and led to what many perceived as a calamitous social upheaval,
the mood of the critics changed. Freund and Wechsler, while still defending the Court, at first cautioned the Court and then retreated from
an active scholarly role. Bickel and Kurland grew more embittered
as the Court seemed to throw off many, if not all, passive restraints
and ventured into new areas. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider the development of each critic individually.
B. Personalities
1.

HerbertWechsler

Wechsler entered the lists, it will be remembered, with his famous
lecture in 1959 taking issue with Learned Hand's attack on judicial review the previous year. 1°° Wechsler found that the Constitution sanctioned and indeed even required judicial review, and that both the
Court and its critics were bound by canons of reason. He observed:
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 318.
Id. at 316.
See Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics, supra note 4, at 460.
BIcr.L, THE Ln.sr DAwGtyous BRANcII, supra note 2.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles,supra note 7.
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[A]d hoc evaluation is, as it has always been, the deepest problem
of our constitutionalism, not only with respect to judgments of the
courts but also in the wider realm in which conflicting constitutional
positions have played a part in our politics.' 0 '
After excoriating political liberals for inconsistency, he argued that the
judicial process should eschew ad hoc resolution of controversies, and
"must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that
is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved."' 102 Thus, the main
qualities of law, its generality and its neutrality, require that every decision rest on principles of "adequate neutrality and generality."' 0 3
Yet by acknowledging that "[t]he basic values of a free society . . .
must be given weight in legislation and administration at the risk of
courting trouble in the courts,"' 0 4 and that the Bill of Rights constituted
an "affirmation of the special values they embody,"'1 5 Wechsler
seemed to be recognizing the primacy of certain values. By admitting
that "some ordering of social values is essential; that all cannot be given
equal weight, if the Bill of Rights is to be maintained,"'1 6 he acknowledged that some more important values inherent in the specifics of the
Bill of Rights could be judicially enforced. Wechsler's critique of the
Supreme Court's alleged lack of application of his principles encompassed the tenures of Chief Justices Stone and Vinson as well as that
of their successor. 10 7 Although conceding that the decisions regarding
white primaries, racially restrictive covenants, and desegregation of
public schools "have the best chance of making an enduring contribution to the quality of our society of any that I know in recent years,' 0 8
Wechsler nonetheless criticized Smith v. Allwright,0 9 Shelley v.
Kraemer,"10 and Brown v. Board of Education"' for doctrinal inadequacies. He posed several questions that were suggested by the implications of the opinions. Could a religious political party preclude nonbelievers under Smith? Why didn't Shelley protect the "legal recogni112
tion of the freedom of the individual" rather than another value?
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 25.
See text accompanying notes 7-11, supra.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles,supra note 7, at 27.
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles, supra note 7, at 29.
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Why did Brown opt for freedom of association rather than freedom
against unwanted association? He found that the Court's decisions
could not answer his questions; thus, he reasoned, the holdings were
Although the questions were themselves
per se "unprincipled."" '
based upon controversial premises," 4 and although their very formulation contradicted common law principles of case-by-case adjudication,

others seized upon the underlying theory as the ultimate test of Supreme Court decision making.
Five years after his major work, Wechsler reentered the fray.
Speaking at the University of Georgia, he raised the twin questions of
the "practical political limits" and the "moral limits" upon the exercise
of judicial power by the Court." 5 Restating his generality and neutral-

ity theme, he argued that the Court should weigh the language of the
Constitution, "including the 'postulates,' as Chief Justice Hughes called
them, that lie behind the words," in reaching its results."16 Wechsler
also admonished that "[h]istory must be weighed, though we must
grant that it can rarely be decisive," but that it "must not be fabricated
or re-written for the purposes of the decision.""-17 As with history, so
with precedent-it is persuasive but not definitive. Although he discussed only Shelley v. Kraemer,118 a decision rendered before the Warren years, and the views of the three "state action" extremists in Bell
v. Maryland,"9 Wechsler informed his southern audience that "[tihe

Courts must respect this moral limit on their power or their power in
the end will not survive."'"2
113. Id.
114. Wechsler's belief that Smith would require a religiously based political party
not to exclude anyone seems questionable, for the case involved a political "club" (1)
open to all, whatever their views, except blacks, and (2) exercising a commanding role
in the state electoral process. Shelley, whatever its muddied ratio decidendi, could be
comprehended as an endorsement of the "legal recognition of the freedom of the individual," since it protected both the willing white seller and the willing black buyer.
Brown need not be viewed as a freedom of association case at all, but can be regarded
as limiting the ability of the state to segregate its facilities irrespective of the wishes
of actual or potential associators. Perhaps the formulations would raise other substantial issues, but they.would not be the somewhat simplistic ones formulated by Wechsler.
For other issues raised by Wechsler's categories, see notes 122-29 infra.
115. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLum. L. REv. 1001 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution].
116. Id. at 1012.
117. Id.
118. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
119. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
120. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution,supra note 115, at 1014.
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Criticism of Wechsler's call tended to be restrained by the rules
of logic that animated Wechsler's thinking. 121 Most responses sought
to demonstrate the logical impracticability of the tenets involved.122
One political scientist saw the standard of neutral principles in decision
making as an attack upon Hugo Black's absolutism. 23 That critic found
it logically sufficient that "a principle is neutrally applied . . . where its

nonapplication in circumstances to which it is arguably applicable
can be justified by reference to competing principles."' 124 Thus, Wechsler was interpreted as actually demanding adequate generality, and

"adequate generality cannot be synonymous with total generality."'125 As a legal philosopher sympathetic to Wechsler's call pointed
out, limited generality depends upon both judicial values and issues-

"not each and every rule of law need be 'general' and 'neutral.' ",126
The philosopher was also uncertain about the "demand that courts decide, on grounds of 'adequate neutrality and generality' and at the same
time . . . that courts should decide 'only the case they have before

them.'

"1127

Wechsler's "liberal critics" argued that literal application of

his test would require the existence of "a Court that could review only
after it had constructed a totally coherent system" and that such a Court

"would in practice not review at all."' 28 This has continued to be the

121. See Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. Cm. L. RFv. 661 (1960); Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the
Profession, 34 Rocirv MT.L. REv. 123 (1962).
122. See Deutsch, supra note 14, at 169, 207. Cf., Snortland & Strang, Neutral
Principles and Decision-Making Theory: An Alternative to Incrementalism, 41 Gso.
WASH. L. REv. 1006 (1973). "It is true that Wechsler's view of the judicial process
is so encompassing that it would not enable the process to function at all. If, however,
proponents of Wechsler's philosophy would accept the position that the Court's primary
responsibility is the systematic resolution of the most important problems, then Wechsler's jurisprudence of reason need not be crippled by paralysis. It is one thing to argue
that all judicial decisions should be guided by neutral principles; it is quite another to
isolate the most important decisions and to ask that judges analyze and predict the consequences and give convincing explanations for their decisions." Id. at 1031.
123. "Black's insistence on 'absolutes' served as the focal point for the 'modest' attack on his views. Yet that insistence eventuates in a call for definite standards in constitutional adjudication that strangely echoes Wechsler's demand for neutral principles."
Deutsch, supra note 14, at 178. "Thus if Wechsler's universe contains constitutional
guarantees judicially enforceable otherwise than by abdication, the very contrast on the
basis of which neutral principles were found necessary mandates that those guarantees
take the form of Justice Black's 'absolutes.'" Id. at 182.
124. Id. at 188.
125. Id. at 190.
126. Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLuM. L.
Rnv. 35, 37 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Golding].
127. Id. at 49.
128. Deutsch, supra note 14, at 190.
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tenor of most criticism.' 2 9 Wechsler has failed to respond to either his
critics or his supporters. 130
2. Paul Freund
Paul Freund viewed the later Warren Court with less severity and

apprehensiveness. His role was to explain the Court to law students and
to other potential mediators of public criticism. Whatever reservations
Freund may have entertained about the role of the Court seemed to

have evaporated as early as 1963. He accepted the fact that the Court
would emulate its predecessors in discerning certain values in the Constitution:
To Marshall's generation [the Constitution] meant the armament
of union, to another age the safeguard of burgeoning wealth, to another the shield of the unorthodox. None of these is wrong; all
are encompassed; some become more central as the nagging problems of American life change character.' 3 '

He recognized that the "Court has a responsibility to maintain the constitutional order, the distribution of public power and the limitations

on that power." "

This characterization earned a vociferous dissent

from Kurland.' 3 3
129. Thus, the critics of Wechsler, as well as his supporters, have sought to furnish
the "neutral principles" he espoused. "[W]hy is not a satisfactory justification for
Brown simply that, in the concrete situation presented, the right to associate weighed
more heavily than that not to associate?" Such a principle would be one of "adequate
generality." Deutsch, supra note 14, at 191. Golding's somewhat more sophisticated
analysis would seem to dispose of Wechsler's problem even more clearly:. "The major
premise of [Brown] is that when a state undertakes a program of public education it
must be made available to all on equal terms. This proposition is really the individualization, for the case, of a more general one about state programs: they all must be made
[Thus, Wechsler's question whether] the 'evil' of
available to all on equal terms ....
the imposition of association on those who wish to avoid it [is] sufficient to justify the
different, and hence, unequal, treatment of equals [is answered] with a 'no' . . . . How

far can we extend the claim of those who wish to avoid an association that is unpleasant
to them? Could this not lead to the invalidation of any form of compulsory education?"
Golding, supra note 126, at 58. For Freund's reformation of the notion of equal protection in the context of preferential treatment for blacks, see text accompanying note 143
infra.
130. See Wechsler, Problems of Policy in the Restatement Work of the American
Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 185 (1968); Symposium, 46 F.R.D. 497, 519 (1968);
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1968).

131. Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, supra note 61, at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Kurland derided Freund's "message" that "the Court, politically the least responsible branch of government, has proved itself to be morally the most responsible."
Kurland, The Court of the Union, supra note 4, at 642. Undoubtedly, Professor Kurland was displeased by Freund's switch from a "kindly" but firm critic of a court char-
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Freund was undoubtedly quicker than his colleagues to acknowledge the creative role of constitutional law. "In a larger sense," he

wrote, "all law resembles art, for the mission of each is to impose a
measure of order on the disorder of experience without stifling the underlying diversity, spontaneity, and disarray. . . . There are, I am
1' 34

afraid, no absolutes in law or art except intelligence.'

By 1965, Freund had essentially endorsed the Warren Court's ju-

dicial stance. Noting that constitutional decisions are essentially
"moral standards wrapped in legal commands,"1 35 and endorsing the
notion that judges help the rest of us think about "social justice and
ethical conduct, ' 136 he even began to question the ethical postulate that
all should obey the law. "Fidelity to law is an obligation based on reciprocity, on the right of participation.""',
Although the Court was required to limit itself as an example to the society, and although simpleminded solutions were not desirable, Freund found no difficulty in en3 and the school
dorsing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan""
prayer deci1
3
9
sions.
Indeed, earlier he had found the New York Times opinion
well reasoned, and his views on separation of church and state had always been strongly separatist. 40 Of Mapp v. Ohio"' he noted that

provisions "for a civil action against the local government for redress
acterized by a "tendency toward overbroadness" and lacking in ability "for refinement
and adaptation of principle" to a more conciliatory stance. See Kurland, The Supreme
Court and its Judicial Critics,supra note 4, at 465.
134. Freund, New Vistas in ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 19, at 646.
135. Freund, ConstitutionalDilemmas, 45 B.U.L. REv. 13, 21 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Freund, ConstitutionalDilemmas].
136. Id. at 22.
137. Id. at 21.
138. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Freund did express some uncertainty about extending
the New York Times rule to encompass an involuntary public figure and argued that
the "tendency of public debate [is] to go after character and reputation, rather than
after the issue, [and this tendency] seems to me endemic . . . " Judicial ConferenceThird Circuit,42 F.R.D. 491, 495-96 (1966).
139. Abingtora School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
140. Freund's own version of "preferred freedoms" surfaced in connection with the
establishment clause of the First Amendment. "Ordinarily I am disposed in grey-area
cases of constitutional law, to let the political process function. Even in dealing with
basic guarantees I would eschew a single form of compliance and leave room for different methods of implementation [citing the exclusionary rule, free press, and self-incrimination problems]." The religious guarantees, however, are of a different order because
"political division on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the First Amendment sought to forestall." Comment, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HRv. L. REv.
1680, 1691-92 (1969).
141. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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against searches and seizures might have forestalled the exclusionary
1 42
rule.,2
He even offered a constitutional rationale for granting blacks
greater rights than whites under the equal protection clause. Rejecting
the classic Harlan formulation that the Constitution should be "color
blind," Freund argued a version of affirmative action:
Equal protection, not color blindness, is the constitutional mandate . . . . Measures to correct racial imbalance are like those to
correct an imbalance in the bargaining position of labor. At least
serve to promote, not to deny,
as transitional measures they may
43
the equal protection of the laws..
Citing issues such as the right to assigned counsel, the exclusionary rule, and reapportionment after Baker v. Carr1 44 but before Reynolds v. Sims, 4 5 Freund asked that critics "recognize that although
there has been highly significant movement in constitutional doctrine
that has to be assimilated rapidly, it has not come as suddenly or as
drastically as the more vehement critics assert."' 4 6 After all, he argued, if Baker "was an extraordinary decision, it was a response to an
extraordinary problem" and a "particularly insistent case. . . . T]he
default of the lawmaking machinery [in Tennessee] had special relevance, for the very structure and processes that are presupposed in rep1 47
He also defended
resentative government had become distorted.'
14 8
nonabsolutist.
the school prayer decisions as
Although he had several opportunities to do so, Freund never
dealt in detail with the "one man, one vote" mandate of Reynolds.'49
In a civil liberties lecture delivered two years after that decision, he
indirectly endorsed it, along with the Warren revolution in general:
In our time the principles of an open society, as they have been
elaborated by the courts, show a basic coherence: freedom of political speech and writing; equality of access to public institutions;
142. Freund, ConstitutionalDilemmas,supra note 135, at 19.
143. Id. at 20.
144. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
145. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
146. Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, supra note 61, at 6.
147. Freund, New Vistas in ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 19, at 638, 639.
148. Id. at 645.
149. He cautioned against the "simplistic criterion of one man, one vote," but noted
that Baker involved "a formulation of the complainants' legal rights [which] may ultimately have to probe deep into the foundations of political philosophy." Id. at 638, 639.
A year later, he briefly criticized Reynolds: "The disparity is not between individuals,
but between groups, between constituencies;" and he hoped for "room for accommodation, for a test of reasonableness." Freund, A Tale of Two Terms, supra note 34, at
236.
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equal and fair treatment in criminal trials; equality of legislative
districts in a state. All but the last of these were launched in the
1930's, by the Court presided over by Chief Justice Hughes. This
has been a remarkable evolution.' 5 0
Freund hailed the civil rights movement, which he felt had "produced
a number of important reforms that go far beyond the racial claims that
inspired them. 1'5 1 He condemned the states for their traditional rejection of meaningful reapportionment, the exclusionary rule, and criminal
procedure reforms in coerced confession cases, arguing again for recognition that the obligation to obey the law must be reciprocal with political access to meaningful participation in the political process. 5 2
Perhaps his failure to join others in condemning Reynolds lay in
an understanding that malapportionment was a cause of state malaise
in our federal system.' 53 He may well have felt that federalism would
be revived rather than stifled by Reynolds. Since he also had argued
that criticism of the Court by state governments could be partially attributable to malapportionment, 154 his indirect endorsement of "one
man, one vote" (following, of course, a pre-Reynolds admonition
against it) may have constituted a recognition that neutral principles
would be almost impossible to apply in this realm and that technical
electoral equality might be the only feasible solution.
If the logic of events or the persuasiveness of the Warren Court
converted him on the question of proper legislative apportionment, the
Court's First Amendment decisions may have contributed to his
changed views about freedom of speech and press. Again, the retirement of Justice Frankfurter in 1962 may have eased the transitional
path, for Frankfurter and Freund were both inextricably connected to
the Vinson Court's balancing test in First Amendment cases.
Among all of the theories behind which the advocates of judicial
restraint united, none is more dubious than the balancing test espoused
[hereinafter cited as Freund, The Challenge of the Law].
150. Freund; The Challenge of the Law, 40 TUL. L. REv. 475, 480 (1966)
151. Id. at 483.
152. Id. at 484.
153. Freund had alluded to this connection throughout the fifties. See, e.g., Freund,
Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MODERN L. REv. 345 (1958). 'There are
signs . . . that the strength of the resistance movement [against the Court] is more
largely in the state capitals and rural areas whose representation predominates in state
government than in the major cities. . . . Like so much else in the American Federation, the problem reverts to the structure of politics, in particular the over-representation
of rural areas and small towns as compared with the municipalities." Id. at 355.
154. Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MODERN L. REv. 345
(1958).
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in free speech cases. It led to such unfortunate results as Chief Justice Vinson's "tortuosities" in American Communications Association

v. Douds.'1 5 McCloskey stated the formula succinctly:
The judge estimates the probability and seriousness ("gravity") of
the evil; he calculates the repression necessary to prevent it; and
he weighs the one against the other. This is the "balancing test";
it is Freund's "weighing of values"; it is Frankfurter's "justification
for curbing utterance where that is warranted" . .. .56

McCloskey found it to be little more than a "roving commission to
make judicial guesses on a wholesale basis.' 5 7 He preferred the
Holmes "clear and present danger" test, which, "what ever its faults,

has some color of objectivity and definition about it.' 66 Indeed, he
went so far as to criticize the Warren Court for not adopting it. 5 '
Freund had been in complete agreement with Frankfurter on First
Amendment issues. He was unhappy with the decision in Lovell v.
Griffin 60 that local governments may not prohibit distribution of noncommercial handbills.'

61

He derided the notion that prior restraint of

speech or press was particularly evil: "The generalization that prior
restraint is particularly obnoxious in civil liberties cases must yield to
more particularistic analysis."' 62 Freund went on to ask: "Is there
any ground in reason for treating differently experiments in social and

economic legislation and experiments in the control of speech and assembly and religious observances?"' 63 Rejecting the "preferred position" doctrine, he warned against a "clash of absolutes.'

64

155. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 29, at 75.
156. McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 80. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951), "the judicial inquiry becomes ... as broad and as conjectural as the legislative
process itself." McCLosnnY, supra at 81.
157. McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 81.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 282. McCloskey unfortunately died in the same year that the Court
re-adopted the "clear and present danger" standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
160. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
161. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rv. 533, 53536 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties].
162. Id. at 539.
163. Id. at 546. Although he approved of the Court's unanimous decision in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), reversing the conviction of a preacher for
speaking in a public park in violation of a city council's arbitrary determination that
he could not, Freund blandly opined that "[tlhere is nothing surprising about the case
except the fact that the Court of Appeals of Maryland had declined to review the conviction on the ground that the issues were not 'matters of public interest.'" Freund, The
Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, supra note 161, at 541.
164. Id. at 546. He cautioned the Court to weigh claims of national security
against those of freedom of speech. "For the Court the problem is the fearful one of
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Yet, even then, his position was not inflexible. Rejecting Black's
celebrated dissent in Adamson v. California'65 that only the first eight
amendments of the Bill of Rights were incorporated into the Fourteenth, Freund argued:
The concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is hardly adequate if it is limited to the specific substantive guarantees of the
first eight Amendments and to procedural guarantees. . .
Jefferson apart, our preceptors in civil liberties have tended to be

judges ....166

Despite this rhetorical willingness to recognize the strength of the
claims of individual freedom, Freund's pessimism about the absoluteness of the First Amendment continued into the third year of the Warren Court. He even took issue with Holmes' view that the First
Amendment protected the ability of an idea to receive acceptance, because that view disregarded the question of truth and validity.Y67 He
thought that the "preferred position" argument had taken an "excessively dramatic form.11 68 "To subordinate all other guarantees to those
of the First Amendment is to smuggle into that amendment the whole
concept of the individual as an end in himself, which is more naturally
a composite of the entire Bill of Rights. And to exalt one guarantee
is to denigrate others."' 69
Yet, this was the same Freund who could later call New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan17 0 "a significant advance in the constitutional protection
of the press.''
This was the same Freund, who, on reflection, found
the balancing test of the First Amendment to be inadequate, and "an
unfortunate concept at best," which detracted from the necessity to
"delimit-not the same as to limit-the right itself."' 72 Clearly, in the
realm of the First Amendment, where his deepest ideological commitments had lain, his universe of discourse had changed. The reality of
that change was even greater than its rhetoric.
so measuring the tensions, or so reviewing the measurements made by others, as not to
appear absurd in the sight of history." Id. at 545.
165. 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
166. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties,supra note 161, at 547, 552.
167. Freund, Law and the Future, supra note 47, at 190. His comments anticipated
Alexander Bickel's later views. See text accompanying notes 446-60 infra.
168. Freund, Law and the Future, supra note 47, at 190.
169. Id. at 191.
170: 3,76 U.S. 254 (1964).
171. Freund, The Challenge of the Law, supra note 150, at 483.
172. Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the JudicialFunction, 44 U.C.L.A.L. RPv. 467,
471 (1967).
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The essential moderation that had characterized his career had not
deserted Freund. In 1954 he could require that "one who sits in judg-

be a philosopher," 17 3 could posit the danment on legislative acts.
ger of "needlessly divisive influence of abstract philosophic premises,"
and could make an "appeal to the process of accommodatiorn and adjustment for the business of living which is exemplified in the adjudicat-

ing function of a constitutional judge.' 174 Eleven years later, during
the storms, he could speak optimistically:
Precisely in a time of warring ideologies there is an opportunity that
ought to be embraced for the law to demonstrate its search for underlying points of agreement and to work out accommodations that
will be tolerable because they recognize a core of validity in more
than one position of the combatants.' 75

Despite Freund's reservations about method and rhetoric, he could incorporate the Warren Court's accomplishments into this consistent formula and find that it had labored to "encourage responsible and respon76
sive government.'
3. Philip Kurland

While Freund took an accommodating, perhaps cautious position
toward the Warren Court, Philip Kurland at first approved, very quickly
became wary, and, before the others, grew increasingly hostile. It
seemed as if the Court continually and perversely refused to learn the
lessons of humility and wisdom, as taught by Frankfurter and Kurland,
and that perversity increasingly angered at least the latter. Because

in Kurland's estimation most justices on the Court were only barely
competent, he thought that they ought to derive whatever wisdom they
were capable of absorbing from their betters, both on and off the
Court.17 7 Again, Kurland's acerbic contempt for many of the justices,
173. Freund, Umpiring the FederalSystem, supra note 40, at 572.
174. Id. at 575.
175. Freund, ConstitutionalDilemmas, supra note 135, at 23.
176. Id.
177. Kurland's standards for admission to the Court were high. Since the function
of the Court was to govern, he felt it should be composed of platonic philosopher-kings.
All extraneous factors, such as geography, race, religion, and especially partisan politics,
were to be ignored. The latter were, he opined, usually based upon "parochial demands
of an actual or potential constituency." Kurland, Appointment and Disappointment, supra note 28, at 197. In that article he was particularly embittered by the roles of labor
and blacks in defeating Judge John J. Parker for appointment to the Supreme Court in
1930. "His defeat resulted partly from his apparently unfortunate habit of following
Supreme Court decisions." Id. at 211. Whatever the merits of Kurland's argument, his
analogy to the great Nixon-Senate battle of 1969 is far-fetched: "In 1969, President
Nixon had two nominations defeated, largely by the same forces that caused the rejec-
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and his own substitution of fiat for analysis in his impatience to demonstrate that the Court was meddlesome and stupid, demonstrated the existence of certain fundamental attitudes that underlay his rhetoric.
tion of Judge Parker and essentially for the same reasons." Id. To equate Nixon's
nomination of Harold Carswell with Hoover's selection of Parker, by any standards, is
stretching things a bit. "The evidence of Carswell's racism was irrefutable," as was "his
lack of candor before the Senate Judiciary Committee." LEVY, supra note 25, at 4445. Thirteen senate republicans voted against confirmation despite Nixon's claim that
personal loyalty to him was involved. Id. at 44. For some reason, Kurland could not
even concede that Nixon's later choices of Mildred Lillie and Hershel Friday were
faulty. He seemed most upset by the role of the American Bar Association in preliminarily vetoing them, calling that body an unrepresentative political entity. Kurland, Appointment and Disappointment, supra note 28, at 212. His studied ambiguity on the
merits--"some think that at least some of these vetoes were warranted-is also peculiar,
unless he believed that no lobbying pressure should be exerted in the nomination process.
Id. at 214. Yet, if such is true, his failure to mention the disgraceful conduct of the
organized bar in the famous Brandeis confirmation battle seems even more peculiar. See
A. TODD,JUST
TRmAL 158-63 (1964).
Kurland' ~coler bout the circumstances under which certain appointees were not
confirmed is excee ed by his scorn of many who were. He challenged the premature
"secular canonization of the great man," Earl Warren, and contended that "it is too early
to sanctify him." Kurland, Earl Warren, the "Warren Court," and the Warren Myths,
67 MicH. L. RnEv. 353 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kurland, Earl Warren]. "There is
no evidence that Warren's influence has extended beyond the power of the one vote that
is conferred upon him as a member of the Court. . . . Mhe Court has formed him
.."
' rather than vice-versa. Id. at 354. "Under Warren's presidency, the Court has
been the most divided, if not the most divisive, in American history." Id. at 355. Finally, if "reliance is to be placed on Warren's individual contributions to American jurisprudence as revealed in his opinions, it will be difficult indeed to justify such laurels."
Id. at 353. For Kurland's own earlier assessment of Warren, see notes 310-11 and accompanying text infra.
Of Black and Douglas, he cryptically noted that they "think it important to wrap
themselves in their judicial trappings. One can only speculate as to the reasons." KuRLAND, PoLrIcs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 8. His
eulogy upon the death of Justice Black was confined to an "impact" analysis. "Almost
never was he successful in selling the Court on his doctrine. Almost always was he
successful in bringing the Court around to the conclusions he would reach by way of
his doctrine." Kurland, Hugo LaFayette Black: In Memoriam, 20 J.PUB. L. 359, 361
(1971). He blamed the influence of Black's broad First Amendment notions for New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, noting "the destruction of the concept of libel . . . [and]
what was once considered obscene . . . is . . . now protected as within the proprieties

of ordinary discourse." Id. at 361. Finally, "[flor better or worse, our Constitution
reads today pretty much as Mr. Justice Black has always wanted us [to] read it." Id. at
362. Justice Douglas particularly rankled Kurland because he refused to play the role
of platonic guardian and actually mingled in the nether regions of politics and world
affairs. "mhat a Justice should treat the business of the Court as a part time occupation, and that he should enter the arena of politics and public controversy, was demeaning of the Court's function in our society." Kurland, Appointment and Disappointment, supra note 28, at 236. Goldberg, another liberal Warren Court Justice, was
dismissed as "always a joiner." KURLAND, PoLrrIcs, THE CONSrrtrrToN, AND THE
WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 134.
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Kurland's warnings were voiced earlier than those of the other
critics. In a speech delivered to the Utah Bar Association, answering
the attack on the Court by the 1958 Conference of Chief Justices of
the States, he warned that "in the forum of public opinion, the wrongs
of the Supreme Court cannot be deemed expiated by the equal or
grosser errors on the part of the courts over which the Chief Justices
of the States preside. '17.? Despite the relatively modest record of the
Warren Court at that time,' 7 Kurland warned against judicial activism:
"It is hard to distinguish between the judicial and legislative functions
on the basis of this activist.

. .

philosophy."'' 10 He admitted, however,

that "[t]his is not a novel theory of judicial power."'181 In contrast to
Wechsler, Kurland regarded the Court as a political rather than a legalistic body, but it is hard to understand just what he meant. In 1959
he found that the Court must "sustain the powers of the responsible
branches of government" unless the exercise of a particular power "patently infringes" the Constitution."8 2 Later he disagreed with those who
believed that "the courts have no role in aiding the transitions that are
demanded by the ever changing conditions of society"' 3 and even endorsed the notion that "[tihe function of the Supreme Court Justice
is governance and the best test of capacity for that office is experience
in governance.' 8 4 If the later Kurland statement was to be taken literally, he sounded like a later Warren, and it is indeed difficult "to distinguish between the judicial and legislative functions on the basis of
this.

. .

philosophy."'' 8

To be fair, Kurland did not confine his contempt for the intellectual capabilities
of the justices to the liberal Warren majority. He found Chief Justice Burger to be
something less than an intellectual giant. "And the notion, for example, that the Chief
Justice of the United States can improve the qualities of the opinions of judges of other
courts would have more credibility if his own opinions were models of excellence. What
he cannot accomplish by example, he is not likely to bring about by precept." Kurland,
1970 Term, supra note 68, at 272. In addition, his warning to Douglas was recapitulated in one to Burger: "The Chief Justice of the United States is not particularly well
equipped to supervise substantive or procedural law reform throughput the nation." Id.
at 271. Burger's reformist zeal "suggests that the job of a Supreme Court Justice is only
a part-time effort. . . . The shoemaker, even the chief shoemaker, should stick to his
last." Id. at 271-72. Just as Kurland's views about Warren changed over time, so did
his skepticism about Burger.
178. Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics,supra note 4, at 458.
179. See text accompanying notes 76-90 supra.
180. Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics,supra note 4, at 464.
181. Id. at 463.
182. Id. at 464.
183. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 321.
184. Kurland, Appointment and Disappointment,supra note 28, at 198.
185. Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics,supra note 4, at 464.
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However, Kurland had earlier enunciated the major themes of the
critics: (1) "too many opinions which obfuscate rather than enlighten," 18 6 (2) the undemocratic nature of judicial activism,'18 and
(3) "the burdens [of] the amount of work which [the Court] must
handle every year."'8 8 He cautioned that the Court required popular
respect, if not necessarily approval. Respect was to be gained, of
course, by an understanding that could come about only through the
intellectual persuasiveness of judicial opinions. 18 9 Five years later
Kurland returned to this final theme in a symposium on certain proposed constitutional amendments to curb the Court. 90 After quickly
deriding the idea of a Court of the Union to review Supreme Court
decisions touching questions of federalism, he spent most of his analysis
on the question whether "the Court's behavior invite[s] its own destruction."' 191 Most of this discussion consisted of unanalyzed siftings
of lengthy excerpts from dissenting opinions to show that there was substance to much of the criticism. He concluded, as might be expected,
that "[tihe Court disregards precedents at will without offering adequate
opinions or, what is worse,
reasons for change [and writes] advisory
02
advise."'
not
do
that
advisory opinions
At that time he went beyond the scope of his previous criticism
in two crucial ways, which were significant in terms of his increasing
political distemper. For apparently the first time, he showed apprehensiveness about the civil rights movement. One item on his bill of
particulars against the Court was its propensity to write or rewrite law
"for the purpose of conferring benefits on Negroes that it would not
afford to others."' 9 3 He was impatient with Freund's acceptance of the

Court's new role and questioned the message that "the Court, politically the least responsible branch of government, has proved itself to
be morally the most responsible."' 94 Kurland, as juror, was still out
on the issue of activism; his decisive verdict of "no" would come later.
Kurland's ambivalence was engendered by a dilemma; democratic
institutions often did not work, and the Court wanted to take up the
186. Id.
187. Id. at 466.
188. Id. at 465. This was written at a time when the court received 2,000 applications and decided approximately 150 cases with opinion each year.
189. Id. at 466.
190. Kurland, The Court of the Union, supra note 4.
191. Id. at 637.
192. Id. at 640.
193. Id. at 639.
194. Id. at 642.
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slack but could not and should not do so. State legislatures, he observed in 1964, were "concerned with their war on Robin Hood and
similarly dangerous radicals,"' 95 and "[t]here can be little doubt that
the other branches of government have failed in meeting some of their
essential obligations to provide constitutional government."' 196 If this
were true, and if, as he was later to say, "[a]n insistence by state legislators on flouting their own laws, more than any novel legal theory,
may well be what moved the Court to action"' 97 in Baker v. Carr, 98
then why did he find judicial activism so distasteful? Indeed, if "centralization of power in the national government has made state legislatures all but redundant,"' 99 then why all the fuss about "one man, one
vote"?
The answer is that Kurland's displeasure extended far beyond the
activities of the Court; his pessimism is directed at the Court only as
an immediate, perhaps symbolic, target. The events of the sixties
showed him that "[t]he herd is regaining its ancient and evil primacy;
civilization is being reversed ... ."o

He feared the pressure of in-

stitutional breakdown in an era of incessant demands upon government,
demands that the representative branches could not fulfill because of
various incapacities. The Court, he believed, was sanctioning and contributing to the breakdown, and ultimately its controversial activities
could contribute to its own breakdown as a vital institution. Indeed,
the vital institution of federalism was under siege long before the Warren Court; John Marshall "spent almost thirty-five years on the supreme bench in doing little else" than engaging in "a constant attrition
'2 0
of state power." 1

Kurland's judgment of doom was reinforced by the apocalypses
of the latd sixties, even before he wrote Politics, the Constitution, and
the Warren Court. Everywhere he looked he found indications that
government itself, shorn of vitality by the steady diminution of federalism, was in extremis.20 2 He pronounced the attenuation of separation
195. Id. at 637.
196. Id. at 642.
197. KURLAN, PoLmcs, Tim CoNsTrrUToN, AND mu WARREN CoURT, supra note
4, at xvii.
198. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
199. KURLAND, PoLrTIcs, THE CoNsrrrmoN,AND THE WnnRmR COURT, supra note
4, at xix.
200. Id. at 16 (quoting Learned Hand).
201. Id. at 57.
202. Kurland, The Importance of Reticence, 1968 Dur L.J. 619 [hereinafter cited
as Kurland, The Importance of Reticence]. "1F]ederalism is moribund if it is not
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of powers a "disease" that "would appear to be terminal," at least in
relation to effective congressional control over foreign policy. 203 He
blamed the Hughes Court for the insupportable doctrine that the president represents the nation in international affairs: "It remained for Mr.
Justice Sutherland and the Supreme Court to 'discover' that the presi-

dential powers over foreign affairs derived not at all from the Constitution but rather from the Crown of England. 2 °4 Institutional restraints
by Congress upon the president, not the "dubious . . . power of judicial review," were absolutely necessary.20 5 Not that such redress
would soon be forthcoming, for Congress, he believed, had failed, and
"[t]he failure of Congress [was] the failure of democracy. The alternatives [were] not pleasant to contemplate. ' 20 6 The extension of his
despair to the people merely underscored the depth of his pessimism. 20 7 He seemed not to notice the contradiction between this view
of an imperial president riding roughshod over Congress and what he
later perceived to be the imperial cowardice of President Nixon in bowing to political pressure from Congress to sign the eighteen-year-old
vote bill.20 3

In a sense, "the people" had always been a problem to Professor
Kurland.

In a tribute to Justice Frankfurter in 1958 he proudly ob-

served: "Neither as a teacher nor as a jurist has he been a 'man of
the people.'"209
Hand:

Twelve years later, he quoted another hero, Learned

dead." Id. at 620. Its demise or decay was caused in part by the "nationalization of
our economic and social life, . . . abuse of the doctrine by reactionaries, . . . pressure
by liberals to place power where they thought they could control it," and state unwillingness or inability to use power. Id. at 621.
203. Id. at 621. In describing a session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on Vietnam, Kurland noted: "The scene epitomized the arrogance of the executive
branch and the . . . nature of the legislative branch of our national government." Id.
at 620.
204. Id. at 622, referring to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). Apparently it did not make much difference, for Kurland felt that "the
United States has no foreign policy." Kurland, The Importance of Reticence, supra note
202, at 622. "Our policy is to react rather than to act." Id. at 623.
205. Id. at 627.
206. Id. at 636. He condemned Congress for passing too many private bills. Id.
at 634. Arguing for "minimal decency" in congressional investigations, he found them
to be "not very amusing spectacles, of which the House Committee on Un-American
Activities is the worst example." Id. at.633.
207. "Ultimately, howeverthe fault lies with the people." Id. at 635.
208. See text accompanying note 347 infra.
209. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 26 U. CM. L. R v. 1, 2 (1958).
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[I]t is possible to convert [the individual] into a fanatical zealot,
ready to torture and destroy and to suffer mutilation and death for
an obscene faith, baseless in fact and morally monstrous. 21 0

Compared to the references to the breakdown of American civilization
that are strewn through his later works,"' Kurland's criticisms of the
Warren Court are small jabs indeed.

Why, then, did he concentrate

upon the Court in particular when, according to his world view, the
entire society was in extremis?

The magnitude of his general concern for society and his discomfort about the specific role of the Court prevented civil liberties probfems-the concern of the Court since at least the forties-from commanding his deep attention. Before the era of the Warren Court, as has
been noted, Kurland had neither pronounced theories of the Court's role

in this realm nor very much to say about its performance.212 Unlike Freund, who found freedom of speech to be an important value
and specifically endorsed New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,21 3 Kurland from the beginning found no independent value to a free press.
The freedom of the press should be conditioned on its function

as a "means of keeping the people informed of the truth, 21 4 Kurland
thought. He disapproved of New York Times;2 "5 and in view of his
210. KURLAND, PoLrrlcs, THE CoNsTrTTON, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note
4, at 16.
211. "The fact of the matter is, of course, that the areas of government in which
the states are sovereign have been reduced almost to nonexistence." KuRLAND, POLITICS,
iE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 53. "The Court may well
be the last governmental bulwark of freedom . . . ." Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note
68, at 321. "If I read the political scene correctly, the Supreme Court . . .is the lone
element of national government committed to the individual." Kurland, The Privileges
and Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last?", 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 420
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause]. The
failure to comprehend that men and institutions are different "may very well prove
fatal to the basic American concept of democratic government." Kurland, The New
Supreme Court, 7 JOHN MARsH. I. PRAc. & PROC. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Kurland, The New Supreme Court]. The federal government's failure to adhere to
principles of checks and balances and separation of powers "has resulted in the inordinate loss of individual freedom from which we suffer today and which is likely to be
exacerbated tomorrow." Id. The executive has not only overridden Congress but has
reduced executive departments to a "menial status." Id. at 3.
212. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
213. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Freund, Constitutional Dilemmas, supra note 135, at
17-18.
214. Kurland, The Supreme Courtand Its .udicial Critics,supra note 4, at 461.
215. "But it must be apparent that what [New York Times] means is a greater protection for the defamer and a diminution of the very small protection that was available
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belief that "media control[s] . . . the American mind," 1 6 his thesis
is not surprising.
Kurland also disparaged the significant issues of criminal procedure adjudication in his 1970 summary of the Warren Court's decisions.
He admitted that criminal procedure decisions differed from other judicially initiated reforms because they confronted administrative officials
rather than coequal branches of government or state legislatures, but
he also found too great an activism in this realm. Although the "crudities of criminal procedure in the states were deep and dangerous cancers in our body politic,"2'17 calling for drastic action, and although the
Warren Court "inherited this movement from predecessor courts, 21 8
federalism nevertheless dictated that judicial intervention, no matter
how modest, was an inappropriate solution.21 9 Moreover, because
those cases required that "precedents both hoary and young were felled
220
with the precision of modern lumberjacks cutting through a forest,"
the results were per se displeasing to him. In his only substantive comment upon Miranda v. Arizona,2 1 Kurland disdainfully insisted that it
was "a highly overrated opinion, by those who approved it no less than
by those who condemned it."' 222 Mapp v. Ohio2 23 agitated him not so
much for its holding as for its willingness to overturn precedent; it departed from the case-by-case, fair trial approach to sanction an intrusion
into state policy making, and it fed "the Court's intoxication with its
own power. ' 224 In the interests of a viable federalism, Kurland felt
that the Court should not formulate prophylactic rules, but should only
adjudicate the few cases that reach it. The cancer, though "deep and
dangerous," should be excised only in those particular cases and should
not be regarded as symptomatic of a more widespread malignancy that
to the defamed." KuRLAND, POLrIcs, THE CoNsTrrToN, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 64.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 83.
218. Id. at 73.
219. "In one sense, the furor that the Court has aroused over the criminal cases
is difficult to comprehend. After all, the only thing that the Warren Court has done
is to demand that the State criminal processes come up to the same standards that are
being imposed on federal criminal processes. But then, that is what federalism is all
about." Id. at 82.
220. Id. at 90.
221. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
222. KuRLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITTION, AND THE WARRMEN COURT, sUpra note
4, at 80.
223. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
224. KuRLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note
4, at 78.
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afflicts state criminal justice systems. Cases the Court could not or
would not review ought to be left to local systems. Kurland did not
consider the possibility that a case-by-case approach would make it difficult for other judges to understand and to follow the Court's mandates.
Unlike other critics, Kurland formally disavowed the civil rights
movement. He lamented the Court's role in sparking and sustaining
225
"the Negro social revolution that engulfs us at this very moment.
Although he admitted that Brown v. Board of Education2 2 "was a return to the understanding of the Slaughter-House Cases concerning the
use for which the [equal protection] clause was framed,' 22 7 he found
that Brown and its progeny had cast a deep knife into "the fabric of
society," with mixed results. 228 According to Kurland, Brown also
raised difficult questions of state action, as well as the scope of congressional power under the commerce clause to reach private, discriminatory conduct. 229 Whether Kurland was bitter about the engulfing black
revolution for its own sake, for its excesses, for the incidence of badly
reasoned judicial opinions considering its legality, or because of his belief that it was the entering wedge for the "egalitarian ethos that is becoming dominant in our society,"2 s0 is a question that will be considered
later. There is no doubt that he felt that enough had already been
done.
4. Alexander Bickel
Alexander Bickel was the youngest and most publicly known of
the critics. He was a contributing editor to the New Republic for many
years, wrote often for other popular publications, including the New
York Times Magazine and Commentary, lectured frequently, and participated in active politics, endorsing and campaigning for liberal candidates such as Robert F. Kennedy.2 3' He was the same combination
of personal reformer and professional skeptic as his mentor, Felix
225. Kurland, Earl Warren, supranote 177, at 358.
226. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
227. KURLAND, PoLrrcs, THE CONSTrU-oN, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note
4, at Ill.
228. Id. at 122.
229. He admitted that the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960's had not extended the
reach of the commerce clause. "The reach of Congress had been equated with its grasp
by the Supreme Court a score of years earlier." Id. at 139. Nor were the Court's decisions upholding congressional authority impeded by any strong judicial precedents. Id.
230. Id. at xx.

231. For a bibliography of his writings and his political alliances, see A. BicKEnL,
Tim MoRa=,"

OF CoNsENT 143-50 (1975).
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Frankfurter. Bickel's interests were protean and extended far beyond
the realms of constitutional law, history, and politics. 23 2 He argued the
Pentagon Papers case 233 on behalf of the New York Times, espousing
the moderate First Amendment position that eventually carried the
Court, and thus repeated the experience of Wechsler, who, almost a
decade earlier, had made the winning argument in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,234 espousing a moderate view of the First Amendment.
Bickel's death late in 1974, at the age of forty-nine, can only be regarded as a profound loss to the profession. However, it is appropriate to consider him as a Warren Court critic who did not become a
Burger Court critic, for the years before his death were extremely
productive ones.
Bickel's development through the decade of the sixties was complex, much more strained than Kurland's, and yet led to a disillusionment so profound that, like Kurland's, it spread far beyond questions
of judicial role and capacity and led to a fundamental examination of
the nature of American democracy. Bickel's caution about the function of the Court is well known. He consistently and cogently argued
that its role in most areas was neither to strike down legislation it did
not like nor to legitimate it. Prudence and its educational function required that the Court often decline cases so that "the political processes
[could be] given relatively free play. '235 He found it legitimate for
the Court to develop "techniques that allow leeway to expediency without abandoning principle. '236 As a result,
the integrity of the Court's principled process should remain unimpaired, since the Court does not involve itself in compromises and
expedient actions. When it does not forbid them on principle, it
anshould withhold intervention altogether, trusting to previously
237
nounced principles to exert their influence on tendency.
Ironically, Bickel's general approval of the early Warren Court's use of
232. He helped draft the War Powers Act of 1973 (50 U.S.C. §§ 154 et seq. (Supp.
1976)), and wrote the introduction to J. JAvrrs, WHO MAKES WAR? (1973). In addition
he wrote extensively about the Warren Commission Report. See, e.g., Bickel, CBS and
the Warren Report, NEw REPUBLIC, July 15, 1967, at 29; Bickel, Re-examining the Warren Report, Nw REPUBLIC, January 7, 1967, at 25; Bickel, Failure of the Warren Report, CoMMENTARY, October, 1966, at 31.
233. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
234. Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow
of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187, 1197-98
(1975).
235. BICKEL, Tim LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 70.
236. Id. at 71.
237. Id. at 95.
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what he termed the "passive virtues" 238s was qualified by a discomfort
with certain decisions that seemed to sanction oppressive congressional
investigations, 3 9 some aspects of the federal government's hunt for subversives, 240 the Connecticut birth control statute, 241 and capital punishment.2 42 Apart from his strong caveat on Baker v. Carr,243 the more
238. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HAnv. L. REV. 40 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bickel, The Passive Virtues].
239. The decision in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), "placed the
crown of principled legitimacy upon the modestly inclined head of the House Un-American Activities Committee." Bickel, The Passive Virutes, supra note 238, at 67. He resurrected the old delegation of powers formula and argued that it "should be as applicable
to the relationship between Congress and one of its committees as between Congress and
the administrative [sic]." Id. at 68. "The sum of it is that the power to investigate
operates of necessity under a suspension of many otherwise applicable rules," id. at 69,
and, when combined with the often inevitable invasions of privacy, requires that Congress closely supervise its committees. Id. at 67.
240. While praising Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), for its statesmanlike action in referring the matter of passport issuance restrictions back to Congress, Bickel
was upset by Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), which
permitted summary dismissals of nonsensitive employees under a federal security program for private industries: "A short-order cook, after all, should have as much right
to her humble job as Mr. Greene had to his career." BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGoEOUS
BRANCH, supra note 2, at 168, referring to Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
"Mhe Court should have required a responsible policy decision to be made, as it did in
Greene." Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 238, at 74.
241. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Bickel quarreled with Frankfurter's contention that the dispute was academic, for the "matter was not academic at the time of
the argument; it became so by decision of the Supreme Court." Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 238, at 60. 'The statute does not speak the present will of dominant
forces in the state. It represents at present a deadlock of wills, from which the Court
was asked to extricate the state." Id. at 61. Bickel even flirted with the European idea
of ignoring statutes when "normal enforcement" of law is absent. Id. at 63. The danger of unenforced legislation, he found, lay in its potential capacity to be utilized for
harassment purposes: 'The books are full also of more sinister enactments, which are
used to prosecute only with exceptional, discriminatory selectivity, and are used most
often administratively, short of prosecutions, to blackmail and harass and cajole people."
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH, supra note 2, at 153. He noted that the consequences of Ullman "must be that a prosecution of persons [like the plaintiffs] would
fail on the ground of desuetude." Bickel, The Passive Virtues, supra note 238, at 64.
He argued that "[i]t is quite wrong for the Court to relieve [Connecticut] of this burden of self-government" by not requiring the state to decide whether its law was still
enforceable. BICEL, THE LEAST DANomous BRANCH, supranote 2, at 156.
242. "Mhe Court has missed or has wilfully passed up its most signal opportunities to shape and reduce the issue." BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note
2, at 242. Commenting upon United States v. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. 273 (1953), he
chastized the Court for lending "its acquiescence, if no more, to a proceeding of grisly
speed, consummated in an atmosphere of the tumbril rolling to the guillotine and the
heads being showed to the mob." BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra
note 2, at 242. He also was repelled by "the equally unspeakable Chessman case"
in which the state of California found that "the only way to stop him was to kill
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liberal Warren Court decisions fit comfortably within Bickel's jurisprudential scheme.

He was aware of the Court's "statesmanlike" role. In a provocative law review article that he published in 1955, he stated that the

Court had admirably fulfilled that role in Brown, a decision that was
in turn consistent with the long term beliefs of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 " Whatever his reservations about the role of the

judiciary, he consistently endorsed the cause of congressional civil
rights action. 24 5 His interest in civil rights causes led him to qualify
his usual cautionary advice to the judiciary in the controversial realm

of state action. He concluded that in Garner v. Louisiana,248 a civil
rights sit-in case, the Warren Court had acted wisely in reversing a conviction on technical grounds and avoiding the larger issue of whether
the use of state officers to enforce private segregation practices constituted impermissible state action. 247 Although he found the broad issue
to be "delusively simple," 2 48 he thought an expansive reading of the

concept possible:

"[A] private policy of segregation on privately

owned premises may differ from a state-enforced policy in degree only;

the effectiveness of both may finally depend on the police power of
the state."24 9 The idea of attacking the applicable statute on grounds

of vagueness appealed to him, for that theory has a "respectable linhim." Id., discussing People v. Chessman, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 341 P.2d 679 (1957).
His comments about the Rosenberg case at this time were mild in comparison to
his bitterness in 1966. "The Rosenberg case was nevertheless an unforgivable disgrace to the American administration of justice." Bickel, The Rosenberg Affair,
COMMENTARY, January, 1966, at 69. The death sentence was "a ghastly and shameful
episode." Id. at 72. 'The sentence was carried out, in effect, in retribution for their
silence. This action is disgusting." Id. at 74. The Supreme Court's vacation of a stay
ordered by Justice Douglas in the matter was "a sin against the Court's very reason for
being." Id. at 76. Bickel was proud of the fact that Frankfurter dissented from denials
of certiorari and from the lifting of the stay of execution. Id.
243. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
244. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Desegregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1955).
245. See, e.g., A. BicKEL, THE MoRALrry OF CONSENT (1975); Bickel, Civil Rights
Act of 1963, NEw REPuBLIC, July 6, 1963, at 9, 146-47; Bickel, Civil Rights Boil-up,
NEw REPUBLIC, June 8, 1963, at 10; Bickel, Civil Rights: The Kennedy Record, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1962, at 11; Bickel, Next Presidentand Civil Rights, Nnw REP BLiC,
October 31, 1960, at 17.
246. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
247. "[A] denial of certiorari would have been indicated, except that it would have
"
BrcaEn, Tim LEAST DANGERous
been extremely harsh on the defendants ....
BRANcH,supra note 2, at 177.
248. Id. at 175.
249. Id.
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eage,"' 250 but he was satisfied that the result reached in Garner "may
thus be regarded as a colloquy with the trial court."'25 Whatever reservations Bickel may have had about the authority of the Court to find
state action, his caution was considerably reduced when Congress had
already chosen to act, as in the sit-in situation.2 52
Bickel was much more a democrat in 1962 than he was a decade
later. Although conceding the necessity for judicial review, he recognized that "it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people
of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing
majority, but against it."253 Moreover, he believed the democratic
process itself was one of "holding to account-all through the exercise
of the franchise." 54 Because that process was vital and because judicial review may have "a tendency over time seriously to weaken the
democratic process," 255 judicial activism should be discouraged. The
great exception to this generalization was judicial protection of the Bill
of Rights from legislative intrusion: "The real question may be
whether [such legislation] is good." 256 Bickel conceded that in addition to traditional Bill of Rights cases an occasional pressing matter,
such as desegregation, may require judicial intervention, but "[g]iven
basis of all its
the nature of a free society and the ultimate consensual
257
effective law, there can be very few such principles."
Bickel's disenchantment with the Warren Court commenced about
a year after Baker v. Carr.25s In a popular article he asserted that the
Court's avoidance of "any comprehensible goal" produced an indefinite
result that would render Baker "perhaps the least likely [decision] to
play a substantial and enduring role in shaping our society."259 Con250. Id. at 177. Kurland, on the other hand, deems the "void-for-vagueness cases"
to be "vague-for-voidness" ones. KURLAND, PoLrscs, an CONsTrrtrON, AND T'FI WARPEN CouRT, supra note 4, at 166.
251. BIcKEr, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 179.
252. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200Q(a); Hamm v. City
of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
253. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 17.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 21.
256. Id. at 39.
257. Id. at 59. He agreed with Wechsler's criticism of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and interpreted it to mean that "[riace is a proscribed
ground of legislative classification, except that it may be used sometimes." BicKEL, Tim
LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 59. Bickel believed, however, that "neutral
principles" did not tell us what values were important and deserving of judicial protection. Id.
258. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
259. Bickel, Reapportionment & Liberal Myths, COMMENTARY, June, 1963, at 483.
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trary to Frankfurter's impassioned dissent in Baker, Bickel conceded
that abstention from the "political thicket" was unsatisfactory insofar
as "willy-nilly, the Court was helping to entrench the status quo. 260
Although he approved of the basic decision in Baker, Bickel found that
certain language in Justice Brennan's opinion was being taken by lower
federal courts to mean that recent apportionments were invalid because
they were "somehow irrational and unconstitutional. '26 1 For him, constitutional rationality, in itself a perfectly valid principle, meant "the absence of demonstrable irrationality."28 2 Since most malapportionments
"favor rural interests over urban, allocate more strength proportionately
to sparsely populated areas than to densely populated ones," 2 3 he
wondered what standard of rationality could be applied. After all, he
analogized, antitrust policy favored the small competitor, farm policy
favored farmers, and First Amendment judicial policy favored distasteful ideas; so what was particularly evil about malapportionment? He
concluded that "the conventional test of rationality cannot generally
lead anywhere in this field-no more than it could lead anywhere in
the field of racial discrimination. 26
As in racial discrimination cases, issues of rational apportionment
must inevitably involve the choice of values. Curiously, Bickel's answer was not that all distinctions among voters must be discarded, but
rather that no principle can be applied. He concluded that "we cannot
look for any enduring result from this particular enterprise in judiciallydirected reform. '265 The idea of "one man, one vote" was not novel,
but it did not seem to Bickel to have the degree of public support necessary for the Court to undertake a major, long-term reform effort.
Bickel's belief that democracy was not best served by "one man, one
vote" contributed to his unease:
Government by consent requires that no segment of society should
feel alienated from the institutions that govern. This means that
the institutions must not merely represent a numerical majoritywhich is a shifting and uncertain quantity anyway-but must reflect the people in all their diversity, so that all the people may
feel that their particular interests and even prejudices, that all their
diverse characteristics, were brought to bear on the decision-making process. 266
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 485 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
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It is difficult to comprehend why malapportioned legislatures reflected
"the people in all their diversity" while the principle of "one man, one
vote" did not, but Bickel embraced this formulation. He contrasted
the presidency, a majoritarian institution essentially elected by the people, to the legislature, a reflective institution that represents other interests: "The political arena is messier than the judicial, to be sure, but
that is where all of us who feel under- or mis-represented should 2be,
67
exerting every ounce of power and influence we can command."
This was the old Frankfurter cry to "sear the conscience" of the legislature, 268 but of course issues of organization that touch on the jobs of
incumbents and on traditional practical arrangements require a somewhat different approach from that taken for principled resolution of
substantive issues. Bickel argued for concentration upon other debilitating evils, such as seniority and committee systems, without noticing
reflect the fundamental difficulties caused by
that such problems 6 often
2 9
malapportionment.
Earlier, Bickel had conceded that the rationale of Colegrove v.
Green270 was no longer acceptable and had granted that "[glovernment
by eight or twelve percent is an extremity that the Court would be justi,171 At that time he had felt that a
"..
fied in viewing as arbitrary ..
267. Id. at 491.
268. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
269. "[S]uburban districts appear to have become more competitive over the decade.
By the late 1960s, suburban House seats were substantially more likely to be hotly contested than were the big-city districts. .

.

. By 1968 . . . contests in the suburban dis-

tricts that had been created in the South were tending to be more closely fought than
those in other southern districts.

. .

."

Cummings, Reapportionment in the 1970s: Its

Affects on Congress, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s, 209, 227 (N. Polsby ed.
1971). "[Ihe suburban districts in the North, which in 1962 were fairly heavily Republican, were by the end of the decade more closely balanced between the parties." Id.
at 230. At least some students of the subject have concluded that, irrespective of the
election results, "reapportionment is associated with important policy changes in the
1960s." Hanson & Crew, The Policy Impact of Reapportionment, 8 L. & Soc. REv. 69,
72 (1973). See also I. SHARKANSKY, SPENDING IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1968); Sharkansky, Reapportionment and Roll Call Voting, 51 Soc. SCI. Q. 129 (1968). The noticeable liberal trend in the congressional elections of 1972 and 1974 may well be attributable, in part at least to redistricting.
270. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
271. Bickel, The Durabilityof Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE LJ. 39, 43 (1962). In
this article he found Frankfurter's rationale in Colegrove to be unpersuasive as there was
"no readily apparent reason why the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of the equal protection of the laws should not similarly [to the fifteenth's guarantee against racial
discrimination] cut across [malapportionment issues] and similarly authorize judicial intervention." Id. at 39. "The disadvantaged voters in Colgrove were injured, their claim
had all the desirable immediacy, and no more suitable plaintiffs are imaginable." Id.
at 40. Frankfurter's finding of lack of judicially manageable standards in Colgrove was,
Bickel found, "rather flatly and generally stated." Id.
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rationality test sounded "good, but . . . chases its own tail," and fear-

ig that the Court might sanction bad apportionments, found himself as
confused about the Court's ultimate role as were the justices themselves.

27 2

In 1965, Bickel noted that Frankfurter's retirement three years

previously "alters the entire judicial landscape." 273 He feared the existence of "too much of stark ideological struggle, too much forcing of
choices between mutually exclusive ideological ultimates, especially
with respect to problems as to which no satisfactory choice between
such ultimates seems possible. '274 Although he let stand his earlier argument that "one man, one vote" went too far, 275 Bickel did not modify
his judgment that Supreme Court inaction in this realm, before Baker,
27 6
had come at too high a price.

Bickel's attitude toward the civil rights movement changed substaxitially between 1965 and 1972. Before the advent of the new left

and black power movements he was sanguine about the revolution in
the streets2 77 and argued that extra-legal demonstrations are "justified
272. Id. at 44.
273. BICKEL, POLITICS
274. Id. at 164.

AND THE WARREN COURT,

supra note 2, at 162.

275. "It is enough justification for unequal districting that it sometimes serves legitimate ends." Id. at 185. 'The remedy for malapportionment lay with "the majoritarian
executive." Id. at 190. "It is at least as important that the largest possible variety of
interests in this immense country be reflected in the House, have access to it, have some
share . . . of power and thus gain . . . a sense of common venture in government
.
" Id. at 194-95. At the beginning of the book, he invoked his customary appeal
to judicial self-restraint: law, to be effective, needed "widespread consent . . . by political means." Id. at x. He found the desideratum to be "principled self-government."
Id. at ix (emphasis in original). He feared the dangers of exclusive reliance on law.
Id. at x. "Equality of representation is one goal, and the only principled one, among
many." BICKEL, Ta LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 192.
276. Although Tennessee's malapportionment was the result of "inertia and oligarchic entrenchment," it would be "a grave error" to go beyond Baker. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 2, at 196-97. "But experience has demonstrated that perfectly sane men assembled in democratic legislatures are also capable
of making choices that are demonstrably irrational." BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN
COURT, supra note 2, at 179. By previous refusal to consider apportionment issues, the
Court had "in actual effect len[t] an aura of Constitutional validity to existing malapportionments." Id. at 176. Bickel was skeptical about organizations that Kurland was wont
to take more seriously. Thus, after noting that state legislatures were "secret places," he
found the Council of State Governments to be an organization "dedicated to high and
worthwhile purposes, of which regrettably little is known." Id. at 150. He dismissed
the proposals of the Council of Chief Justices for curbing the Court as "not a little
simple-minded," "somewhat fatuous," and evidence of "a generalized desire to be let
alone." Id. at 158.
277. See BICKEL, PoLITICs AND THE WAX EN COURT, supranote 2, at 77.
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because [they are] right, because behind the force of numbers is a
moral force ...
"2718 Street encounters in a good cause required that
society "subject itself to some inconvenience and risk" to prove its good
faith toward blacks. 279 Although he was worried about young blacks'
increasing "affinity to nihilism,"28 0 he found mere homilies of obedience to law insufficient2 8 1 and believed that "[w]e cannot, by total reliance on law, escape the duty to judge right and wrong."2 82 He found
the difference between pro-segregationist disruptions and Martin
Luther King's street demonstrations to lie "in the moral difference in the
ends.1 28 3 In 1965 Bickel went to Mississippi to participate in a symposium on the theme of southern justice. 28 4 He forthrightly argued
that "Jim Crow justice" was a "not inaccurate phrase.$ 285 Among
other reforms of a system that could not protect civil rights workers,
he proposed congressional supervision of jury selection procedures in
local courts and a congressional declaration that the failure of local officials to punish certain classes of crime constituted a denial of equal protection by the state. 28 6 He was not at all troubled by the problem of
federalism.
Throughout the sixties Bickel adhered to his expansive position on
the Bill of Rights.287 He found, moreover, that his distinction between
substance and procedure remained viable. The distinction appears in
his view of the criminal law:
[I]ts prime function is to encourage and sustain civilized conduct,
to declare and confirm the basic moral code, then the justice and
evenness of its administration, the decent and civilized, calm and
self-consistent manner in which it is brought to bear are crucial to
the attainment of its objectives, and are of a much higher order
of importance than
considerations of the speed and effectiveness
[of enforcement]. 288
Thus, he was under no illusions about the ability of the criminal law
and its processes to deter crime. Rather, he believed that society
"must rely on other institutions to remove the conditions that breed"
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 82.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Bickel, Justice and Protection,37 Miss. LJ. 407 (1966).
Id.
Id. at 411.
See text accompanying note 256 supra.
Bickel, JudicialReview of Police Methods, supra note 51, at 963.
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crime.28 9 Again, in anticipation of a wisdom that was to become popular a decade later, he saw that "confinement in prison leads to more
criminal conduct than it prevents. 29 0
For Bickel, the ability of the criminal law to function both fairly
and properly created no conflicts. "[T]he values that are just now
playing a dominant role in the case law will be shown to be decisive
values, not only compatible with the objectives of a sensible criminal
code, but fairly indispensable to their attainment." 291 Although Bickel's New Republic writings of the late sixties reflected a growing ambivalence, he continued to support the Warren revolution in criminal justice. In July of 1969, he still believed that the Court's role lay in its
ability to be an "effective instrument for ensuring fairness and justice
in the government's dealings with the individual" and in at least raising,
if not deciding, issues of principle. 292 Within the next few months, he
deplored a Nixon drug bill, 293 attacked the Senate's ideological opposition to Clement Haynsworth's nomination to the Supreme Court,294 and
argued passionately against student participation in control of universi5
ties. 29
Bickel's decisive shift into the camp of substantive critics was
marked by the publication of his 1969 Holmes lecture, The Supreme
Court and the Idea of Progress.296 While not quarreling with the Warren Court's criminal justice decisions, including Miranda v. Arizona,2 9 7
289. Id.
290. Id. at 964.
291. Id.
292. Bickel, Close of the Warren Era, NEw REPUBLIC, July 12, 1969, at 15.
293. "[C]ondemnation and jail alone have not worked. The theory of the Administration's new bill is that more condemnation and more jail will work." Bickel, How
to Beat Crime, NEw REPuBmc, Aug. 23 & 30, 1969, at 10-11. The bill's proposal of a
mandatory minimum five year sentence for possession or transfer of marijuana would involve "the administration, not of justice, but of injustice." Id. at 11. Preventive detention
was constitutionally dubious, and given the impossibility of prediction of future criminal
conduct or of establishment of meaningful standards, "King Hunch" would reign. Id.
at 12. Bickel proposed the traditional liberal solution of more money and more social
programs to benefit the poor. Id.
294. Bickel, Does it Stand Up?, NEw REPuBLIc, Nov. 1, 1969, at 13. The nomination was "ideologically. . . within that area of tolerance in which the Senate defers to
the President's initiative," but Haynsworth's ethics were a suitable ground for skepticism
and possible rejection. Id. at 15.
295. Bickel, Student Demands and Academic Freedom, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 20,
1969, at 15.
296. BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PRoGRss, supra note 2.
297. Bickel believed that the "basic matters of criminal procedure were ultimately
the province of judges." Id. at 32. Miranda he regarded as a "radical, if justifiable,
departure from prior practice." Id. at 49. But it was a "soundly. . . principled decision." Id. at 96.
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he argued that it had reached "a natural quantitative limit to the number of major, principled interventions the Court can permit itself per
decade ...."21 After criticizing some individual Warren Court decisions for their apparent lack of rigor, he concluded that the egalitarian
299
goal of the Court might be unachievable, given certain social trends.
Bickel's attachment to the First Amendment led him to condemn bitterly the obscenity decision in Ginzburg v. United States.300 His strong
stance against capital punishment led to the statement that the decision
in Witherspoon v. Illinois3"' was ,improvident, even though it held that
exclusion of principled jurors opposed to capital punishment violated
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Bickel felt that the ruling indirectly
approved the death penalty. His gentle language about the liberal
Warren Court decisions betrayed disquiet, rather than the burning resentment so characteristic of Kurland. The resentment would come
later; for the moment, the criticism was that the Warren Court's notion
of progress, although perhaps laudable, had failed to move the society
because it was imposed upon that society by an elite group with no authority to define general social goals and no power to implement
3 02
them.
C. The Critics Compared

Thus, the Court's critics followed somewhat divergent paths
through the turbulent sixties, and the deepest beliefs of some were
shaken or at least modified. Wechsler, the man who started the scholarly commentary, had almost vanished from the scene. Freund had
found some of his deepest convictions tested and found wanting. Graciously admitting this, he still maintained some skepticism about the
judicial process. Kurland, who was disappointed by most of the
justices over whom Warren presided, was embittered not only by the
Court but also by the state of society. Bickel was ambivalent, denigrat298. Id. at 94.
299. He feared that the reapportionment decisions would be reduced to triviality
with the passage of time. Id. at 111. Brown, he thought, would lead to a "dramatic
centralization of control over the public schools." Id. at 135. Praising what he thought
was the separatist movement among American blacks, he noted that other courts had
engaged in social engineering, but that "most of its prior enterprises [had] not worked
out." Id. at 176.
300. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Ginzburg was a "grim episode in the temple of justice."
BicuL, THE IDEA OF PROoRESS, supra note 2, at 51. In that case, "the Court punished
a man under a rule applicable to no one else, past or future." Id. at 54.
301. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
302. "[By right, the idea of progress is common property." BIcKEL, THE IDEA OF
PROGREss, supra note 2,at 181.
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ing the twin drives of the Court toward desegregation and greater governmental responsiveness, but believing that the criminal justice revolu-

tion was worthwhile. 30 3 All four men had been through a time of trial,
as had society, and their universe of discourse had changed, as had that
3 04

of society.

Of the four, Freund alone seemed never to attack the Court. He

accepted the tenets of the Warren enterprise and was concerned to defend it from its numerous lay critics. He was, however, only an occasional participant in the commentary.

They all worried about whether

the Court's battles with influential institutions-especially Congresscould be won, and at what cost. Kurland, who had changed the least

throughout this period, still felt that the principles of federalism had
been violated, that the Court was not one "of errors and appeals,"3 05
but was a "symbol of the majesty of the law and of the never-ending

but never-accomplished quest for justice. ' 30 6 He could not reconcile
himself to what he had once called "institutional schizophrenia" 0 7 and
could not, consequently, delineate the role the Court should play. He
could write that activism-the "demand that the Court undertake to

provide a solution of its own making for each of the primary social and
economic issues of our time"--was wrong, but that the "duty of the
Court was to keep the [political] ring free." 308s He came to abhor the
name of Earl Warren and retrospectively to play down his role in
Brown v. Board of Education,30 9 although earlier he had written: "His-

tory will find an important place for [Warren] because of his deeds
rather than his words."31 0

Indeed, he could exult that Brown was to

Warren as Dred Scott had been to Taney, except that "time has proved
303. Whether in fact there was a "revolution," as perceived by friends and foes
alike, in a lawyer's perspective is dubious. See generally LEvY, supra note 25, at 7-12;
Blasi, Observation: A Requiem for the Warren Court, 48 TExAs L. REv. 608 (1970).
For Bickel's view that the Warren Court constituted the culmination of certain historical
developments, see text accompanying notes 464-68 infra.
304. "In 1950 who would have believed that anyone in American politics would ever
again speak of right and wrong rather than security and plenty." Shapiro, Foreword
to MCCLoSKEY, supra note 29, at vi. Freund viewed the Warren Court's response to
problems of American life as a natural development of the Court's function. See text
accompanying notes 131-34 supra.
305. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its JudicialCritics,supra note 4, at 465.
306. Kurland, Appointment and Disappointment,supra note 28, at 184.
307. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its JudicialCritics,supra note 4, at 463.
308. Kurland, Appointment and Disappointment, supra note 28, at 193, quoting
Felix Frankfurter.
309. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Kurland, Earl Warren, supra note 177, at 356.
310. Kurland, Book Review, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 170, 171 (1959).
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Taney wrong; it will vindicate Warren." 311 A decade later, that judgment would change dramatically and bitterly, and with no mention of
or explanation for the inconsistency.
On June 23, 1969, Warren Burger became the fifteenth chief justice of the United States. Almost immediately the mood changed;

there was a sense that the Warren revolution was or soon would be
over. Kurland sensed it in Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren
Court.31 2 The critics seemed to reflect a national mood of reconciliation. Perhaps courts as well as presidents are afforded a "honeymoon
period." The Burger Court's honeymoon lasted from three to five
years. For several years, Kurland's annual contribution to the Supreme
Court Review proclaimed a state of indecisiveness in the Court. 313
Others, however, perceived greater form in decisions during the first
three years of Burger's tenure, at least in civil liberties and, to a lesser

extent, in civil rights cases.3 14 Although Burger himself had frequently
criticized the Warren Court, 313 the subsequent appointments of Harry
Blackmun and Lewis Powell indicated that conservative moderates
would reduce the activist heat generated by the Warren Court without
311. Id. In defending Warren from his judicial and political critics (without mentioning the gathering scholarly criticism, including Kurland's own), Kurland asserted
that "[h]istory as well as reason will exonerate Warren of the charges levelled against
him" and that there was "courage as well as wisdom in [the Brown] opinion." Id. at
180, 181. In his later work, Kurland opined that Brown was "a step that would have
been taken even with Fred Vinson still occupying the office of Chief Justice." Kurland,
Earl Warren, supra note 177, at 356.
312. "Certainly the outlook of the Court has already been vastly changed by the
substitution of Warren Burger for Earl Warren and Harry Blackmun for Abe Fortas."
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN CouRT, supra note 4, at 49.
Bickel also commented upon the changed atmosphere. See Bickel, The New Supreme
Court: Prospectsand Problems,45 TuL. L. REv. 229 (1971).
313. His review of the Court's 1969 term concluded that "the Court has not been
substantially changed, if at all, by the appointment of a new Chief Justice." Kurland,
Enter the Burger Court, supra note 67, at 91. One year later, though, "a new day
[had] dawned in constitutional jurisprudence," and the deaths of Harlan and Black "now
assure[d] the change." Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 265. "In its third
year, the Burger Court continued in a condition of flux." Kurland, 1971 Term: The
Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 Sup. CT. REVIEW 181 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Kurland, 1971 Term].
314. LEVY, supra note 25; Dershowitz & Ely, Comment: Harris v. New York: 4
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority,
80 YArE L.J. 1198 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz & Ely]; Stephens, The
Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEo. LJ.249 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Stephens]; Tigar, The Supreme Court 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of
Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Tigar].
315. Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-69, 60 CORNELL L. RnV. 743 (1975); LEvY, supra note 25, at 14-20.
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turning it off."1 6 Even William Rehnquist, a controversial criminal justice "hardliner" as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for John Mitchell, was endorsed for the Court by Professor Freund.31 17 Thus, the attitude of quiescence seemed to be necessary, welcome, and justified.
Some of the critics returned to other pursuits. Wechsler seemed
to have lost interest in the controversy he had been instrumental in creating. Freund became occupied as editor of a multi-volume history of
the Court and began researching his own contribution to the series, a
discussion of the Hughes Court. He also accepted an appointment by
Chief Justice Burger as chairman of a commission to consider relieving
the Court's workload. Kurland and Bickel remained active, but the latter increased his nonscholarly commentary, began to formulate his
thoughts about reviving the "conservative tradition" in America, and
completed his contribution to the Supreme Court series, a volume on
the years of Chief Justice Taft. It was as if these men had been stirred
first by the controversy and then by the activities of the Warren Court,
and were now returning to the occasional law review pieces on the
Court that had characterized their reaction to the Vinson years. Bickel
never even answered Judge J. Skelly Wright's 1970 attack on him; 318
Kurland dismissed it with what had become his usual distemper.3 1 9
The mood of quiescence, while perhaps initially justified, might
have been somewhat inappropriate as the Burger Court began to reconsider Warren Court precedents, especially in the realm of criminal justice. After all, the critics, especially Bickel and Freund, had acquiesced in and even hailed those procedural rulings that helped achieve
justice for the accused in criminal cases.32 0 It was of course their mentors, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Jackson, who believed that the true
test of a civilization lay in the dignity of its procedures.3 2 ' Frankfurter
had made an enduring contribution toward assuring fair procedure for
22
the accused, especially in federal criminal cases.
316. Howard, Mr. fustice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 Mica. L.
RFv. 445 (1972); LEvY, supra note 25, at 47-54.
317. TIME, Nov. 1, 1971, at 19.
318. Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
H.Av. L. Rev. 769 (1970).
319. "But only for the simpleminded are all things simple." Kurland, 1970 Term,
supra note 68, at 267.
320. See text accompanying notes 51-60, 144-46, 287-92 supra.
321. "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, L).
322. "In the federal cases [where] he was dependable enough," Frankfurter's "abiding repugnance toward procedural irregularity" enabled him to write some of his "most
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There was considerable evidence that the Burger Court not only
was refusing to extend the Warren Court's development of due process,
but was trimming it, discarding many of its most fundamental tenets,
and engaging in the kind of activism that would decrease liberty and
enhance the power of the state. Some critics thought the Court was
committing the very errors of logic, of faulty and even dishonest use
of precedents, and of disregard for dissenting views that created such
a furor when committed by the Warren Court. Leonard Levy had
said:
The Bill of Rights requires an ardently sympathetic if not a liberal
activist Court. There is no way for the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to have real meaning if not enforced by unstinting
judicial
3 23
affirmations that keep restraints upon government.
One need not adhere completely to his position to agree with Levy's
criticism of the new Court:
It does not confront complicated constitutional questions with appropriate disinterestedness. Its opinions do not provide intellectually convincing explanations for its results. . . . T]he majority
abuses or ignores precedents or refuses to consider fairly and seriously the arguments advanced by dissenting opinions. 324
Thus it might be expected that issues including, but often transcending,
craftsmanship would evoke a quizzical, if not skeptical response from
men who had become accustomed to dissecting judicial opinions. No
such response was forthcoming.
D. The Critics' Response to the Burger Court
1. Philip Kurland
The record indicates that the Burger Court, whatever its perceived
shortcomings, formulated certain attitudes and pursued certain paths
that appealed to Kurland and Bickel, the only Warren Court critics who
continued critical writing. For instance, the new chief justice's evident
concern for reducing the Court's workload echoed an old Kurland complaint.3 25 Kurland also approved of certain major doctrinal changes,
since he had not endorsed the original doctrines in the first place.
brilliant opinions," especially in those cases involving search and seizure. MCCLOSKEY,
supra note 29, at 102, 103.
323. LEvy, supra note 25, at 440.
324. Id. at 438.
325. See Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 272. Bickel shared Kurland's
concern and in 1973 wrote a book defending proposals to limit the Court's business.
A. BicKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING, TO Do
ABOUT IT (1973) [hereinafter cited as BIcKEL, THn CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT].
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The Burger Court's willingness to undermine "one man, one vote"
was approved without much consideration of the logic or process involved. In 1971, Kurland noted that the Burger Court "seems to have
forgotten the forgettable words of Chief Justice Warren himself, in
Reynolds v. Sims: 'Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast
votes.' "326 He was dubious about Harlan's insistence that "the Court
. . . supply an alternative rationale 3' 2 7 to majoritarianism, pointing out
that Harlan "was hard put, as anyone must be, to discover what that
rationale might be. '3 28 Others might argue that the lack of any adequate alternative rationale would justify the simple "one man, one vote"
standard. To Kurland, such a deficiency indicated that the Court
should never have entered the political thicket in the first place. Yet
he admitted the need "for removing partisanship from apportionment, 1 29 although he did not know just how such removal could be
accomplished and just how such removal would preclude the judiciary
from the mechanics of apportionment.
Kurland, who was as disenchanted with the Warren Court's First
Amendment decisions as he was with its reapportionment decision, found
the Pentagon Papers case 330 to be an example of the Nixon administration's "capacity for making molehills into mountains and giants out of
pygmies." 33 ' The pygmy in the oase was Daniel Ellsberg, whose name
was not even mentioned in Kurland's four and a half page analysis of the
decision. 33 2 Kurland was not bothered by Bicke's representation of the
New York Times in that case, because Bickel and the government both
agreed on the basic proposition that, under extreme circumstances, a
newspaper could be enjoined. Kurland's hostility to the new left was
333 protected
evinced by his acerbic comment that Cohen v. California
four letter words often used by "the literati of the universities and the
ghettos. 33 4 He dolefully noted that "[tihe First Amendment decisions
See also Bickel, The Overworked Court: A Reply to Arthur J. Goldberg, NEw REPumLIC, Feb. 17, 1973, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Bickel, The Overworked Court].
326. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 284.
327. Id. at 283.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 284. Kurland had always believed that Reynolds gave political power
to the more conservative suburbs and therefore disliked the consequences as well as the
principle of "one man, one vote."
330. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
331. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 285.
332. The only reference to Ellsberg was indirect: "a person who secured access to
[the papers] as a member of the RAND Corporation team.... " Id.
333. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
334. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 291.
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of the Burger Court at the 1970 Term do not show any major departures from the patterns established by the Warren Court."33' 5
Indeed, as Kurland oast a baleful eye upon Burger's first term, he

lamented what he perceived to be the essential continuity of the new
Court and the old one. "[T1he Court has not been substantially

changed, if at all, by the appointment of a new Chief Justice."3 36 He
even feared that Chief Justice Burger would become captive of the re-

maining Warren justices. 33 7 He reiterated the themes of logical absurdity,3 38 judicial pandering to both press and public, and the Court's
continued propensity to arrogate power.13
Kurland saw a continuation of Warren Court principles in Chief
Justice Burger's opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,3 40 holding that

the use of tests that were not job related to bar blacks from advancement within a company violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964;41 but he commented that "the conclusion reached was more
cautious than [Earl Warren] was likely to have essayed. '3 42 Another
Burger Court case upholding a woman's claim under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment3 43 was dismissed as "a victory for 'women's liberation.' ",s4" He criticized Burger's interest in
sentencing inequities and penal reform as "adding this realm to, if not
substituting it for [the Court's] already extensive domain. '345 He was
particularly upset by the Burger Court's continuing recognition of the
right to travel34 6 and by its endorsement of congressional authority to
335. Id. at 298.
336. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, supra note 67, at 91.
337. "Burger is, however, closer to Chief Justice Warren's jurisprudence and talents
than he is to those of a Frankfurter or a Jackson. It is possible that the new Chief
Justice, like the old one, instead of molding the Court in his own image will instead
be made over in the image of the Court." Id.
338. Id. at 92, referring to the 1969 Term's reapportionment decisions.
339. The Court, he found, "continued to write a code of criminal procedure for the
states. Dissenters found succor in the Court's decisions, as did the press. . . . Precedents were treated cavalierly .

. .

.

The domain of judicial authority, if not judicial

power, was expanded." Id.
340. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
341. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (Supp.
H, 1974).
342. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 273-74.
343. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
344. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 274.
345. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, supra note 67, at 60.
346. "[i3t has become apparent that the right to travel has become an omnibus category reminiscent of the long-discarded and little-lamented 'freedom of contract.' That
all of the Justices except Harlan find meaning in it suggests that judgment by label is
likely to continue into the new regime." Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 275.
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establish eighteen as the minimum age requirement for voting in fed3 47
eral elections.
Despite his announcement in 1971 that "[a] new day has dawned
in constitutional jurisprudence,"3 48 Kurland was disturbed that the accession of new justices could change constitutional doctrines; he found
it to be yet another legacy of the Warren Court and its supporters. 349
He did acknowledge that erratic inconsistency was a hallmark of the
Court, even prior to the Warren years; 350 but he deplored the Court's

continuing tendency to produce divisiveness rather than unified opinions: "During the 1970 Term, the Court was as divided as in the past,
but not more so." 35 In sum, he viewed the 1970 Term as a transitional one, one during which doctrinal development all but ceased; he

8 52
forecast that substitution of new for old doctrines was still to come.
Kurland's proclamation of a new constitutional era was somewhat
qualified after 1970. Although he exulted that "[tjhe Age of Aquarius is dead,"35 3 he was not sure what would follow.3" 4 For him, the
Warren Court tradition of favoring the claims of certain groups would
be continued, although the identities of such constituencies would

347. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). "The Constitution by its terms,
as a strict constructionist like Mr. Justice Black should have recognized, clearly distinguished between 'time, place, and manner' [of congressional elections, which Congress
has ultimate authority to regulate] and 'qualifications of electors' [which were left to
the states]." Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 277.
348. Id. at 265.
349. Id.
350. "Mhose who would recognize no institutional obligations to continuity ...
used to be the 'liberals' . . .they will now be the 'conservatives."' Id. at 266. Liberals, he argued, called "for flexibility, for the adaptation of the 'central meanings'
to the times . . . ." Id. The Court ought to be able to say why it is changing a rule. "And when it does say why, it ought to do so honestly and not disingenuously or fraudulently. This has been the burden of my complaint over the years about
the Warren Court . . . ." Id. at 267. Kurland's implied charge that only liberals had
previously demanded that constitutional law retain flexibility to meet changing needs disregards his own prior professed belief that such flexibility was necessary. See note 73
and accompanying text supra. Kurland did acknowledge that erratic change "was the
essence of [his] mentor's complaints about Courts that long preceded the Warren Court."
Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 267, referring to Thomas Reed Powell.
351. Id. at 269.
352. He noted with insight that the 1970 term "brought the Warren Court movement in Constitutional doctrine to a sudden halt. It did not so much substitute new
doctrines-that is still to come-as place limits on the expansion of the old ones." Id.
at 272 (emphasis added).
353. Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 14.
354. His uncertainties are to be found in comments such as the following: 'The
new Supreme Court has not yet iaken shape." Id. "The perspective of time will reveal
the new Court's dominant characteristics. They have not yet emerged." Id. at 9.
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surely change. 355 Given that orientation and given the venturesomeness of the Court in the abortion decision, 35 6 he could only observe despairingly that the new Court "has failed to account properly for its
judgments. It has issued decrees but it has not afforded adequate ra357
tionales for them; it has attempted to rule by fiat rather than reason.1
Thus, the "primary defect" of the Warren Court was repeated by its
successor. Kurland was bothered not by the propensity of that successor to overrule or to limit "bad" Warren Court decisions, such as
those in the criminal justice area, but rather by its interest in "governing" in realms such as abortion and women's rights.
Kurland concluded that the most important task for the Burger
Court would be "[t]he constitutionalization of the welfare state";358
and because of his evident disenchantment with such a task, he devoted
little analysis to the problems and precedents involved. He found the
Burger Court's treatment of cases in this area "inconsistent with the
trend of earlier decisions, but not inconsistent with their holdings." 59
One such case was Wyman v. James,3 60 which permitted states to discontinue benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children if
the parent refused to allow home visits by a social worker. Kurland
noted that the majority opinion in Wyman resurrected "language about
the right of a donor of charity to condition his grants,"', but he made no
comment upon this rather startling revival of the distinction between
rights and privileges, a distinction long thought dead, and of its specific
application to the poor.362
Despite reservations about both Warren and Burger Court activism, Kurland and the other critics shared certain strong, particularized
feelings about issues such as the juvenile justice system and capital punishment. Kurland had never criticized In re Gault,3 63 and in the
355. It was as yet unknown "which groups will be selected by the Court as its clientele, its wards, its constituency," except that "[tihus far the Burger Court seems to have
taken only 'Women's Lib' under its protective wing." Id. at 10-11.
356. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
357. Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 13-14.
358. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 314.
359. Kurland, 1970 Term, supranote 68, at 311.
360. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
361. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 311.
362. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HRv.L. Rtv. 1439 (1968). For McCloskey, the Warren Court's attack on
the distinction between rights and privileges "clears up an old and gaping ambiguity in
American constitutional law." McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 167.
363. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Burger Court's first year he expressly approved it." One of the interesting anomalies of Kurland's position is his belief that "[s]ooner or
later the death sentence will be abolished.

' s65

Apparently because of

his belief in abolition, Kurland reviewed only briefly3 66 the decision in
Furman v. Georgia,s67 a complex congerie of cases occupying almost
250 pages and consisting of nine separate opinions. If Kurland was imposing his own ipse dixit in conflict with the judgments of over thirty
state legislatures that re-enacted capital punishment statutes after Furman, he was doing what he argued the Warren Court should not do. As
Leonard Levy had indicated, there are difficulties in finding that the
death penalty per se violates the Eighth Amendment. 6 s

When Kurland's personal beliefs were not at stake, he found crucial procedural issues too complex for meaningful analysis.

He could

find, in relation to the new Court's Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rulings, that "some areas of criminal procedure are sufficiently
confused and lacking in doctrinal bases that almost any new rationalization will seem to have merit. '3 69 Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
issues, "one of the Court's most intractable problems," 70 were re3 71
duced in his estimation to a "doctrinal morass.1
Kurland's attention span was distinctly limited when assessing the
Burger Court's line of cases that "radically transformed the meaning of
trial by jury in American criminal cases. '3 72 He described Williams v.
Florida7 3s as a rather uncontroversial decision: "Few were startled by
364. "Unless and until the juvenile courts can be demonstrated to be really different
in their nature from other criminal courts, the road on which the Court embarked in In
Re Gault is not likely to be abandoned." Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, supra note
67, at 45-46.
365. Id. at 56.
366. Kurland, The New Supreme Court,supra note 211, at 7-8.
367. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding state death penalties unconstitutional as applied).
368. "The prohibition of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishments appears if the same Bill of Rights that clearly sanctions the death penalty."
L vy, supra note 25, at 396. Levy thought that both Marshall and Brennan, in Furman,
had ignored considerable contrary evidence to argue unconvincingly that the death penalty does "not comport with human dignity," a judgment that Levy found both subjective
and unsubstantiated. Id. at 397. Levy, who appears to favor retention of the death penalty and who is convinced that there are no constitutional grounds for abolition, found
that Powell's and Burger's opinions were the best in this difficult case. Id. at 409-18.
369. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 298.
370. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, supra note 67, at 51.
371. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 306.
372. LuvY, supra note 25, at 259.
373. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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the permission to the states to use juries of less than twelve. 's 74 He
did not find it worthy of comment that Justice White found by an exercise of fiat that a jury of six functions in the same manner and serves
the same purpose as the traditional jury of twelve, that Justice White's
use of statistical evidence was faulty, that it was historically inaccurate
to find that the original choice of twelve as the proper jury size was
"accidental," or that lack of evidence of the founding fathers' intentions
should not necessarily be construed as lack of interest in, or a sign of
their assumptions about, the appropriate number. 75 Kurland disapproved of the Warren Court's tendency "to treat the jury, especially in
criminal cases, as the palladium of justice ... ."76

One cannot be

quite sure that the Warren Court ever really sanctified the jury trial,
as Kurland opined; 7 7 while it made the right to jury trial binding upon
the states by incorporating it into the Fourteenth Amendment, it did
the same with virtually the entire Bill of Rights. 3 78 In many situations,
the Warren Court regarded juries with some suspicion and refused to
countenance certain prejudicial trial procedures that would, the Court
believed, deprive the defendant of a fair trial even with the most meticulous limiting instructions by the judge. 7 9 The Court certainly believed that a jury trial was important, if not necessary in every criminal
prosecution. 3 0
Because Miranda v. Arizona,"8 ' like Brown v. Board of Educa3
tion, 8 2 was "more important now as a symbol than as a reality" to Professor Kurland, he did not find particularly troublesome the Burger
Court's opinions limiting its application. 83 Thus Harris v. New
York,3 84 "one of the most scandalous, extraordinary, and inexplicable
[opinions] in the history of the Court" to one scholar,885 completely
escaped Kurland's rapidly dulling scalpel. Kurland accepted Chief
374. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, supra note 67, at 37.
375. See LEVY,supra note 25, at 264-76.
376. Kurland, Enter the Burger Court, supra note 67, at 35.
377. Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 8.
378. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.

335 (1963).
379. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368

(1964).
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 10.
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
IEvy, supra note 25, at 149.
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Justice Burger's majority conclusion that only dictum in Miranda disapproved the use of impeachment evidence obtained without the appropriate warnings.3 86

Yet the principle of Miranda was broad and un-

equivocal; it had been restated by Chief Justice Warren several times
in the clearest possible language.

87

Whatever one may think of the

wisdom of deciding the case on such a broad principle, it constituted the rationale of the decision. Five United States courts of
appeals and the appellate courts of nine states had so held.38 8 As two
other critics of Harris observed, "a pervasive and unambiguous aspect
of Miranda was its explicit rejection of distinctions based on the manner

in which a statement is used by the Government or the degree to which
it is helpful to it."3 89 In addition to misreading Miranda, Kurland emulated Burger's citation of Walder v. United States9 0 as authority for the
proposition that illegally obtained evidence could be used for purposes
of general impeachment.3 9 ' Walder permitted introduction of evidence

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth, as had occurred in Harris, only when the defendant took the stand and denied
386. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 301-02.
387. Miranda held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "The warnings
required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement
made by a defendant. No distinctions can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to 'admissions' of part or all of an offense.
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to
the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police
interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 476-77.
388. United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); Blair v. United States, 401
F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d
998 (10th Cir. 1967); Velarde v. People, 171 Colo. 261, 466 P.2d 919 (1970); State
v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968); Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d
487 (1969); People v. Wilson, 20 Mich. App. 410, 174 N.W.2d 79 (1969); State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970); State v.* Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d
581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237
A.2d 209 (1968); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968);
Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967). See also Breedlove v. Beto,
404 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967);
Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Kelly v. King, 196 So. 2d 525
(Miss. 1967).
389. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 314, at 1209.
390. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
391. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 301.
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any prior criminal activity. The evidence in Walder had been illegally
seized years earlier in a totally unrelated case; its use was permitted
only because the defendant testified on a collateral issue, and the decision itself constituted a limited exception to a venerable precedent, Agnello v. United States.3 92 Even had Walder been relevant to impeachment of the defendant's denial of guilt of the crime for which he was
now being tried, both Burger's opinion and Kurland's commentary left
unanswered the remaining question of whether the use of illegally
obtained, but nonetheless probative, evidence under the Fourth Amendment could be equated with a questionable confession under the Fifth.
If Miranda meant anything, it meant that station house interrogation
was inherently coercive,3 93 a rationale that played no part in Chief Justice Burger's analysis. The Chief Justice also misstated the record by
denying that voluntariness in the pre-Miranda sense was at issue.
New York had conceded that it had the duty to afford defendant a
hearing on that issue, even if the evidence was to be introduced solely
to impeach.3 94 It is difficult to quarrel with Levy's outraged characterization of Harris:
'Monstrous' was the right word to describe the fundamentally immoral opinion by Burger. It was based on deceit and distortion.
[It] was an apostolic message to the police and prosecutors
throughout the land that the courts would cooperate in condoning
deliberate misconduct and excesses.3 95
Kurland's equanimity about Harriscan only be attributed to his general
disenchantment with Warren Court precedents. Although he was
never particularly agitated by Miranda, he relegated it to the netherregion of ad hoc decision making, a sort of limbo in which many Warren Court decisions resided. Given that perspective, it did not surprise
him that "the life span of [Miranda] may be even shorter than most
of the constitutional precedents of recent origin. '39 6 Indeed, by 1973,
Mirandahad become "infamous"' 97 and he remained placid in the face
of the Burger Court's restrictive attitude toward it.39 8
Yet, it is necessary to inquire whether Mirandawas only a symbol
that had no effect upon the reality once eloquently described by Bickel,
392. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
393. Bickel had recognized as much at a much earlier date. See text accompanying
notes 58-60 supra.
394. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 314, 1206-08.
395. LnvY, supra note 25, at 161.
396. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 303.
397. Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 8.
398. See id.
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and whether symbols do not often play social roles quite as important
as reality. Was Kurland's bland contention that there had been "no
noticeable improvement in police behavior" as a result of Miranda
really true?399 Was his impatience with the jury system justified, or
did that system, when introduced or extended by virtue of the Warren
Court's decisions, validate the integrity of criminal proceedings?400
Because Kurland is not a simple man, it would be unfair to characterize him as being totally unconcerned about the drift of the Burger
Court's criminal justice decisions. For instance, he was mildly disturbed about the holding in United States v. White4"' that evidence obtained through a microphone concealed on a friend of the defendant,
who was actually a government agent, could be used in court, despite
Katz v. United States.40 2 Although the holding commanded a clear
majority, Justice White's reasoning did not, and the plethora of opinions reassured Kurland "that the resolution of the problem is still some
distance away." 403 The case aroused his "fears of Orwell's 1984,
which may not be as frightening to some as it ought to be."'4 04 One
case that stimulated the famed Kurland capacity for scorn was Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,40 5 an otherwise little-discussed 1971 case involving a conviction for contempt of court. He noted that "the Court did
contrive to restrict further the powers of a court under the contempt
rubric in keeping not only with the precedents but with the direction of
the Warren Court. 4 0 6 Mayberry admittedly involved a conviction "for
patently contumacious conduct," 40 7 but Kurland failed to note that the
Court unanimously reversed a startling prison sentence of eleven to
twenty-two years. Mayberry was an unusual case but hardly justified
the implied conclusion that defendants could thereafter safely insult
trial judges.
In sum, it was clear that Kurland approved of some of the thrusts
of the Burger Court, and this mitigated any inclination to hold it to the
399. Id. at 7.
400. "The experience in New York City after Baldwin argues for an extension of
the right to trial by jury even in cases where the maximum possible penalty is less than
six months, validating the Black-Douglas position in that case." LEvy, supra note 25,
at 266, referring to Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
401. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
402. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
403. Kurland, 1970 Term, supranote 68, at 301.
404. Id.
405. 400U.S. 455 (1971).
406. Kurland, 1970 Term, supra note 68, at 307-08.
407. Id. at 308.
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strict standards demanded of the Warren Court. Perhaps the Burger
Court could restore some vitality to the moribund concept of federalism; it was Kurland's ongoing commitment to federalism that underlay
his praise for new decisions limiting the applicability of the state action
concept for judically mandated desegregation purposes. Because the
Warren Court dealt with the problem in terms of ad hoe resolutions, 0°
and because its decisions were and "remained unprincipled, except to the
extent that it be regarded as a principle to expand the concept even
if rational justification is not forthcoming," 409 the Burger Court's narrowing constructions were justifiable. Indeed, Kurland felt that Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis410 was more than justifiable; it was "closer to
the original understanding, whatever weight that should be given in
constitutional adjudication. ' 41 He observed that "[o]nce more the
Burger Court seems to have marked
the end of a long road created and
'412
Court.
Warren
the
by
traveled
In the fourth year of the Burger tenure, federalism remained in
atrophy. The federal income tax, the incompetence of local government, and the "grasp for power by the central government" 413 all continued to trouble Kurland. The states had "become moribund as agencies of government. ' 41 4 Much of the blame, in his opinion, lay with the
Warren Court; he said of Mapp v. Ohio41 5 that "the Court was prepared
to impose on the states its own expansive notions of a code of criminal
procedure ..
,416 In Baker v. Carr,4 7 "the Court was prepared to
"..
prescribe the proper form of government for the states." 418 Significantly, he did not include the Burger Court in his indictment, although
he was not sure that it could entirely resist the pressures brought by a
408. Kurland, 1971 Term, supra note 313, at 187.
409. Id. at 190.

410. 407 US. 163 (1972).
411. Kurland, 1971 Term, supra note 313, at 190.
412. Id. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), has always
rankled Professor Kurland. The expansion of "state action" to encompass leased facilities in a public place was accomplished by "a rather murky opinion" which failed to
isolate "the factors that transmuted the action of the restaurateur into state action."
KURND, POLMiTCS, THE CONSITrUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at 127.
On the other hand, Freund had no difficulty with Burton because "state owned facilities
[were] involved, through lease or similar arrangement." Freund, New Vistas in ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 19, at 640.
413. Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 2.
414. Id.
415. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
416. Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 6.
417. 369, U.S. 186 (1962).
418. Kurland, The New Supreme Court, supra note 211, at 6.
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"'new breed' of constitutional lawyers"4'19 to gain sanction for "the prop-

osition that constitutional law is not a creator of society but a creature
420
of it."
Kurland's analysis of Wisconsin v. Yoder 21 was especially revealing
in this context. He derived some pleasure from the Court's denial of

Wisconsin's authority to apply in full its compulsory school attendance
laws to the Amish.422 He was pleased by the fact that, in Yoder, "the
concept of the importance of secondary education [had] received such
419. Kurland, The Privilegesand Immunities Clause, supra note 211, at 406.
420. Id. at 418. He found that the new Court had not yet repudiated "conceptions
of equality that in recent years have been the most potent, if not the most cogent, forces
in giving new meaning to the basic test." Id. at 405. One Warren Court decision,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), "did not say that there was a constitutional
right to welfare, but it was only one step from doing so. And the means to that end
was the right to travel, a central ingredient of the privileges and immunities of American
citizens." Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause, supra note 211, at 417. He
found the slogan "right to travel" to be a "substitute for both the words and the meaning
of the Constitution . . . ." Id. See also note 346 supra. In acknowledging that the techniques of Madison Avenue" had ritualistically replaced "judgment and reason as guides
to constitutional meaning," he condemned not only the Warren Court but its predecessors. Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause, supra note 211, at 417. He was
not sanguine about the Burger Court's ability to resist a "privileges and immunities"
claim to "adequate and appropriate educational opportunity." Id. at 419. He should
have been more optimistic, for the Court did resist such a claim, at least on equal protection grounds, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
421. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
422. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. Rv. 213 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kurland,
The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses]. As was true of Freund (see note 140 supra), Kurland was extremely tolerant
of the Warren Court's decisions on the religion clauses of the First Amendment. He
defended Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), as supported by precedent and correctly decided. See
KuRLAND, PoLrTIcs, THE CONSTITUON, AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 4, at
xvii-xviii. Kurland's first reaction to Engel was approbative, for he found that "[tlhe
holding of the Court was, indeed, a narrow one." Kurland, The Regents' Prayer
Case: Full of Sound and Fury Signifying . . . , 1962 Sup. Cr. REvmw 1, 15. Some
of his usual reservations, like the lack of "governing principle," were disregarded. Id.
at 13. Although on the standing issue he wished that the Court would give a "fuller
explanation of what it is doing," he found it "perhaps desirable [to permit] a very
limited class to exert the powers of a watchdog to keep the schools, the most vulnerable
area, free from the imposition of religious indoctrination." Id. at 22. In a tone
remarkably reminiscent of Warren's opinion in Brown, he opined that "[Hbistory is a
useful tool to help find an answer; it is seldom an answer in itself." Id. He denied
that "'due process' is static and does not change with the development of the country."
Id. at 24. The year before, Kurland had written an article analyzing the Stone Court's
religious decisions and had, after reformulating their rationales, approved them as
being consistent with his notion of the First Amendment, a notion that stressed "that
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a blow from the judiciary." 423 His usual complaints against the Court
were instead directed against public education: "more and more
schooling seems to produce less and less education for those subjected
to the process";4 24 but he noted that if educational success was measured by "egalitarian" and "quantitative" standards, 425 then "[wihat is
the justification for compulsory secondary education . . .?"21 The
state's proffered justification, Kurland mused, had traditionally prevailed over "the religious preferences of some citizens. 427 He had little substantive quarrel with this opinion although it discarded both Brown
v. Board of Education428 and Brown's paean to the civic virtues of education, rejected the notion "that religion is a divisive force that can
and frequently does fragment the larger community,"' 429 and "transferred
the power over the individual from the government to the church. 4 3° He
duly commented upon the irony that Chief Justice Burger, in demanding that Wisconsin demonstrate a compelling interest in enforcing its
compulsory attendance laws, was contradicting his own views in equal
protection cases.431 Whether Kurland's mild reservations would be resolved by future decisions or merely evinced a benign acceptance of
some bad craftsmanship by the Burger majority, his conclusion was
almost jaunty:
A critic finds it difficult to be hard on a Court that dealt so gently
with the Amish and their virtues. .

.

. The result of Yoder then

is to be applauded, on humanitarian grounds if no other. Maybe
it is really an ecology case and not a religious case. The worry remains whether bad law is made by easy cases more often than by
hard cases. But stare decisis having become even more outmoded
than the Amish seventeenth century way of life, perhaps the implications of Yoder ought not to concern us unduly. For certainly
it may 482
be said that the ways of the Court, too, are wonderful to

behold.

government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because [the
religion] clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or
to impose a burden." Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1, 6 (1961).
423. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, supra note 422, at 229.
424. Id. at 214.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 230.

427. Id. at 231.
428. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
429. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, supra note 422, at 234.

430. Id. at 241.
431. Id. at 232.

432. Id. at 244-45.
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Kurland apparently was content to share the Burger Court's nostalgia for a better, simpler way of life, a way uncluttered by the demands of competitiveness and educational achievement, a way that preceded and transcended the egalitarian drive of both the society and the
Court. Perhaps it was also Kurland's way of making peace with the
Burger Court, for, in the 1974 Supreme Court Review, he announced
that he was abandoning the practice of reviewing all of the Court's de438
cisions during a given term in favor of more "studies in depth.
There is unlikely, therefore, to be a Politics, the Constitution, and the
Burger Courtin the future.
2. Alexander Bickel
If Kurland made his peace with the Burger Court, it can be said
that Bickel never engaged it in any form of real combat or analysis. Although he continued to write prolifically until his death, he
alluded only fleetingly to the new Court's activities. Since many of
that Court's criminal procedure opinions stirred controversy, and since
Bickel had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Warren Court's revolution in this realm, something more than the occasional brief comment
might have been expected.
That substantive comment did not come may have stemmed from
several interrelated factors. Bickel's long-time characterization of the
Bill of Rights decisions as procedural may have made him less attentive
to judicial glossings of those rights. Even in his supportive commentaries he had not devoted much analytical energy to the details of the
Warren Court decisions. It seemed sufficient to pose the general problem, to assure himself that the Court was dealing with it, and even to
endorse more expansive judicial interpretations than he would have approved at one time. Although Bickels interest in civil liberties was sincere, it ran deeply only in First Amendment cases, so that some of the
Burger Court modifications may not have readily provoked his concern.
The great irony lies in Bickel's complete comfort with judicial activism
in this realm. It was almost as though having found an area of broad
competence for the Court, he had sighed in relief and exercised a critical moratorium of his own; he deemed criminal justice questions to be
reverse political questions, not -fitfor the kind of analysis he liked to render in other areas. Additionally he was devoting a substantial amount
of energy to his major work on the Taft Court, the development of a
433. Kurland, Prefatory note, 1974 Sup. Cr. REVmw, at ix.
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new conservative philosophy, and the raising of public alarms about the
state of American life, especially during the Watergate period.
Yet, even taking account of these factors, it is difficult to understand his casual endorsements of the Burger Court decisions in Johnson
v. Louisiana43 4 and Kastigar v. United States, 3 5 a case that gave even
Professor Kurland some trouble.4 38 Was Kastigar "wholly persuasive," 437 when the decision confounded and abused the precedents in
an area where, even during the contentious sixties, "the Court had not
been divided, although other Fifth Amendment issues [were] showcases
of controversy . .. ,43s
Bickers uncharacteristic lack of analytical
rigor for the holding in Kastigar, that "use" immunity for compelled
testimony was constitutional, may be attributable to his high regard
for Justice Powell's abilities, and to a belief that the justice had donned
the Frankfurter-Harlan mantle of responsible conservatism.4 3 9 At the
moment there is not much evidence that Justice Powell is the true
successor to that tradition, which held the federal government to high
standards of conduct.
Although in the sixties Bickel had been content to permit a reprint
of some earlier essays on reapportionment, without amending them to
include any commentary upon Reynolds v. Sims, 4 0 in the early seventies he again castigated the Warren Court for not asking whether a particular districting scheme
tends to enhance minorities rule, whether it tends to include or to
exclude various groups from influence, and whether, if it assigns
disproportionate influence to some groups, they are the ones which
are relatively shortchanged elsewhere, so that the total effect is
the achievement of a balance of influence. 441
Bickel argued that the Court should have exercised a limited role in
434. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).

435. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
436. In the context of commenting that there is an "ambivalence on the part of the
new Court about the privilege against self-incrimination," Kurland noted that in Kastigar,
"[tlhe opinion marched to its answer." Kurland, 1971 Term, supra note 313, at 298,
303.
437. Bickel, Powell's Day, NEw REPUBLIC, June 10, 1972, at 12 [hereinafter cited
as Bickel, Powell's Day].
438. LVY, supra note 25, at 179.
439. Bickel, Powell's Day, supra note 437, at 11. Bickel found Powell's opinions
to be "deliberate, thoroughly professional." Id. at 12. For other early looks at Mr. Justice Powell, see authorities cited in note 316 supra.
440. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
441. Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPoRTIoNMENT IN
rTH 1970s, at 60 (N. Polsby ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Bickel, The Supreme Court
and Reapportionment].
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compelling reapportionment; he found authority for that role in the

guarantee clause, a rather startling innovation in itself. 442 He updated
his criticism to incorporate within it a concern that "one man, one vote"
would perpetuate the social disorder within the nation:
At a time when division among groups and interests is as marked
and deeply felt as ever; when unity is something to be striven for,
to be painstakingly constructed and perhaps attained, but not to
be taken for granted; when the call for functional decentralization
in government is insistent; at a time, in sum, when the participatory
aspect of our democracy needs the greatest emphasis and when,
therefore, the device of federalism should be available for the freest
4 48
and most imaginative use, the Court has virtually outlawed it.

Bickel thus returned to his earlier emphasis upon group rather than individual representation as being the crucial value to be protected in apportionment. He did so without revealing how groups could be suffi-

ciently represented, by what principles the existence of such a group
could be determined, and whether his principle was any better than the
"plainly wrong" principles adopted by the Warren Court.44 4

Bickel's citation of Madison for the proposition that political activity emanates from groups rather than through the medium of individual

acts is ironic, for if FederalistNumber 10 stands for anything it is the
proposition that factions are inherently evil, that they "are united and
activated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse
to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community, ' 445 and that their activities should be mitigated.

Madison's attempts to enunciate methods for controlling factions run directly counter to Bickel's desire to recognize them.

One method of

nullifying the effects of factionalism is to create a political environment
that would diversify citizens' political interests, thereby fragmenting
442. Id. at 61, referring to U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The proposition is startling
because the guarantee clause has long been held to involve political questions not appropriate for judicial resolution. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
443. Bickel, The Supreme Court and Reapportionment,supra note 441, at 72.
444. Id. at 60. Professor Carl T. Auerbach, commenting upon Bickel's concern
with group rights, noted that "direct representation of group or interest is undesirable
in a democracy. The values sought by such representation are inconsistent with those
promoted by geographic districting. While the former exacerbates the clash of different
groups and interests by politicizing them, the latter mutes the clash by emphasizing the
role of the individual voter as citizen ...
"In any case, the systems of apportionment and geographic districting [before
Baker] were hardly designed to insure a 'balance of influence' of all groups and interests." Auerbach, Commentary, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s, at 77-78 (N.
Polsby ed. 1971).
445. THm FEaDEAisT PAPERS 78 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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them and inhibiting a commitment to any one faction that could overwhelm the public interest. Bickel's vague prescription would freeze
groups in much the same way that Tennessee froze its "factions" prior
to Baker and would diminish the ability of men to form new factions,
to perceive new interests, and to diversify their political activities, because the existing structure would penalize them for such activity.
What is interesting in Bickel's analysis, however, is his reluctance to accept the Warren Court's conception of man as a unique, non-groupjoining, or at least multi-group-joining, entity. If group rights are the
focus of his concern about reapportionment, then they are critical to an
understanding of his later philosophical development.
Perhaps nothing was as characteristic of that philosophical development in the seventies as his reconsideration of the First Amendment.
His representation of the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers
case, 446 argued and won on traditional "prior restraint" grounds, was
apparently at some personal cost. Yet free press and free speech issues were, for him, quite different. In January, 1971, in Commentary
magazine, he analyzed the Chicago Seven trial, probably the most symbolic of the new left-government confrontations of the late sixties, and
devoted most of the piece to an attack on a book sympathetic to the
defendants.447 That book happened to be written by the "Godfather"
of the New York Review, a magazine as earnestly dedicated to support
of the new left (especially in its opposition to the war in Vietnam) as
Commentary was to its destruction. To view Bickel's piece as only a
part of the Commentary vendetta-a vendetta that extended far beyond the new left itself-would be misleading; the article expressed
Bickel's honest and deeply felt quandary about the function of speech
in perilous times. 448 He argued that the very substantial advances in
social justice of the preceding twenty-five years had made the intensity
of the defendants' attacks upon the system ludicrous; he did not acknowledge the irony of his attribution of those advances to the Supreme
Court, many of whose decisions449he had challenged and which, a year
earlier, he had harshly criticized.
446. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
447. Bickel, Judging the Chicago Trial, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1971, at 31 [hereinafter
cited as Bickel, Judging the Chicago Trial], attacking J. EpsTEIN, THE GREAT CONsPIRAcY TRIAL (1970).
448. The battle was a cultural as well as a political war. See P. NOBILE, INTELLECTUAL SKYWRITING 125-86 (1974).
449. Bickel, Judging the Chicago Trial,supra note 447, at 35-36.
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Although he doubted the fairness of the Chicago Seven trial, he
posited something akin to a theory of waiver by the defendants of that
particular right: "For defendants committed to. . .a revolution, inter0 Despite
-".
est in the legality of the Chicago trial was spurious .

the admission that the defendants had negotiated in good faith for permits to use various Chicago parks to speak out at the 1968 Democratic
Convention, he found merit in that city's decision to deny the permits
because of threats of drug use, barricade-jumping, and lovemaking in
the parks,4 5 I a form of prior restraint which had little legal basis.452
Positing a peculiar version of the clear and present danger test, Bickel
distinguished between the "constitutional duty to grant a permit for a
peaceable and lawful demonstration" and "constitutional authority to
deny a permit for a demonstration that looks to be disorderly and unlawful. .

. ."51

The phrase "looks to be" raises more questions than

it answers. Based apparently upon defendants' reputations and conduct
subsequent to the denial of the permits, Bickel's conclusion was that
the prosecution was plausible.454
Bickel's disenchantment with what he perceived to be the consequences of absolutist free speech became evident in another Commentary article. 455 Fearing that "[d]isastrously, unacceptably noxious
doctrine can prevail, and can be made to prevail by the most innocent
sort of advocacy," 456 he questioned the Holmesian concept of a "marketplace of ideas. 457 He had always been troubled by Holmes' ethical
relativism, and found it inapplicable to ideas such as segregation. To
allow such ideas to compete would turn the marketplace into a bullring, and to encourage these ideas and to abandon humanitarian notions
of social justice "is to commit moral suicide."'4 58 Just how this doctrine
was to be institutionalized, especially for one who four years earlier had
450. Id. at 36.
451. Id. at 38.
452. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Carroll v.
President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Hague
v.CIO,307 U.S. 496 (1939).
453. Bickel, Judging the Chicago Trial, supra note 447, at 38.
454. Id. at 39.
455. Bickel, The "Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open" First Amendment: From
"Sullivan" to the PentagonPapers, COMmENTARY, Nov. 1972, at 60 [hereinafter cited as
Bickel, From Sullivan to the PentagonPapers].
456. Id. at 64.
457. Id. at 66.
458. Id.
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argued that obscenity should not be regulated by the criminal law, 45 9

was never spelled out. Bickel's increasing affinity for the conservative
notion of the organic nature of society precluded any concern about the

inadequacy of specific social, political, and legal arrangements to protect the good and to outlaw the worthless idea.

Thus, the beginning

of the article was a paean to the nineteenth century, when limits of
speech were undefined and appeared to be boundless; he concluded
with a plea to the government and to the press in the late twentieth

century to accommodate informally each other's needs in order to "con'4 0
trive to avoid most judgments that we do not know how to make."
It is a great burden on the twentieth century philosopher to attempt to

restore the values of the past century in a world that has so irrevocably
changed. The drive to do so, whether in the form of Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder"' or Bickel's own work, is based

on the questionable premise that great social conflicts, giving rise to difficult constitutional problems, simply did not exist.4 62 The opposite
premise is that conflicts existed but were unrecognized or unacknowledged." 3
Bickel's major foray into the causes of social unrest and the War-

ren Court's role in creating or stimulating that unrest was contained in
Watergate and the Legal Order, a 1974 Commentary article. 464 Bickel
reviewed the sixties, arguing that the roots of Watergate lay in the civil
disorders of the previous decade "including the most peaceable and legitimate ones of all," which "carried the clear and present danger of

anarchy. '465 All civil disobedience was an "attempt to coerce the legal
order" and "an exercise of power. ' 4 6 Although he cautioned that it
"However else obscenity might be controlled, it should not be punishable crimBickel, Book Review, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1968, at 100.
Bickel, From Sullivan to the Pentagon Papers,supra note 455, at 67.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See I. ROCHE, SENTENCED TO LnE 269-308 (1974); J. ROCHE, SHADOw AN
SUBSTANCE: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND STRUCTURE, OF POLITICS (1964).
463. See L. WmPPLE, THE STORY OF Crvr LIBERTY IN THE UNrrED STATES 261324 (1927).
464. Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1974, at 19
[hereinafter cited as Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order].
465. Id. at 24.
466. Id. at 21. Bickel was somewhat ambivalent, even at this point, about civil disobedience. "Neither the vote nor speech . . sufficiently differentiates needs and interests, or expresses intensity." Hence, the "legitimacy" of civil disobedience must be recognized. Id. This is of course a reiteration of his earlier views. But, for reasons
he did not explain, he felt that the civil rights and anti-war movements transgressed the
limits of civil disobedience and that "Watergate is a replica of the transgressions." Id.
at 22. He may have been thinking of violence, which of course exceeds the morally
459.
inally."
460.
461.
462.
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was "vulgar" to "attempt to turn Watergate into a reproach to liberal
opinion, '40 7 five pages after this sensible pronouncement he did just
that, arguing that Watergate "was a leaf from the Warren Court's book
..

. ,,48

He cited the reapportionment decisions in support of his

thesis that the Warren Court had encouraged a sort of "populism of the
day."4 9 It was the Court's approval of the "assault upon the legal
order by moral imperatives" 70 that engendered Nixon's assault. It is
difficult to analyze the hidden assumptions, the fiats, the lack of "passive virtues" in this bitter diatribe. Underneath it all is a certain
naYvet6, accepting Nixon's explanations for his actions-the protection
of something called "national security"--as the unquestioned truth.
Thus, on reflection, trivia and irrelevancy were no longer, for
Bickel, sufficient to describe the consequences of the Warren Court

revolution. Rather, complicity or at least encouragement of the disintegration of the social fabric-evidenced by both the new left and the
acceptable boundaries of civil disobedience, but if so, he surely could not have meant
to tar the movements with that broad and sticky brush. That he may have been concerned with something else is apparent from a lecture delivered the preceding year. See
Bickel, Civil Disobedience and the Duty to Obey, 8 GONZAGA L. REv. 199 (1973), where
he notes that civil disobedience may be a "part of the process of law formation, even
if an extraordinary and risky part." Id. at 200. He was uncomfortable about the "freedom rides" of the early sixties but settled for calling them a "disorderly method of verifying the observance of federal law," rather than civil disobedience per se. Id. at 201.
He did note that although civil rights demonstrations had been generally peaceful, some
"were just out and out, illegal civil disobedience." Id. at 211. He unequivocally condemned Martin Luther King's defiance of an illegal court order enjoining a march in
Alabama, for such defiance "questions the very legal order itself." Id. at 213. Somewhat undercutting his later thesis that the Warren Court encouraged civil disobedience,
he noted that the Court had upheld the contempt conviction involved. Walker v. City
of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The transition between his earlier view that civil
disobedience was often justified and his 1974 condemnation of even the most peaceable
and legitimate demonstrations appears at the end of the article. Since civil disobedience
always threatened "anarchy" because it is habit-forming, there "must be few" occasions
for its exercise. Bickel, Civil Disobedience and the Duty to Obey, supra at 214. As
with earlier First Amendment theory, a balancing test between the importance of the
issue involved and the threat of anarchy was required prior to the decision to undertake
any act of civil disobedience. He concluded that the imbalance lay "on the side of
obedience." Id. The article was significant for some other reasons, including Bickel's
disenchantment with any purist view of the First Amendment, as he argued that a
speaker can be silenced "to prevent a violent disaster. Even such a lawful activity as
the freedom rides may be stopped under emergency circumstances of this sort." Id. at
216. His disenchantment with the "liberal contractarian view" of Locke also surfaced,
as did his affinity for Edmund Burke. Id. at 209, 216.
467. Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, supra note 464, at 20.
468. Id. at 25.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 24.
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reaction to it by the Nixon administration-were added as additional,
more significant, charges. Indeed, Bickers disillusionment with the War-

ren Court was to extend to a more profound criticism of the general direction American society had taken in the twentieth century. 71 Despite
his increasing pessimism, there nevertheless remains something mysterious in his failure to assess the changes in direction of the Burger

Court as it completed its third significant year at the time of Bickel's
death.
3.

Paul Freund

Paul Freund not only did not question Warren Burger, in the seventies he went to work for the new chief justice. He chaired a commission that, at Chief Justice Burger's behest, investigated the problem
of Court overload and rendered a report recommending the creation
of a National Court of Appeals.472 That report, perhaps prudently not
endorsed by the chief justice, immediately became the focus of a controversy about the Court's fundamental role in our society. Reactions
to the report followed what many perceived to be political lines. The
remnants of the old Warren majority, both on and off the Court, found
that its recommendations undermined the Court's role as a sanctuary
for minorities. 473 A moderate justice of the Court was cautious about
its far-reaching implications.4 74 The academics were divided on the
issue of its constitutionality. 4 75 Bickel, whose conception of the Court's
function approached that of Freund, endorsed the report as being
workable, harmful to no one, and helpful to everyone. 4 76 He answered
471. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
472. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LoAD
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972). Bickel was also a member of the study group.
473. Cf. Brennan, Chief Justice Warren, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4 (1974); Goldberg,
One Supreme Court, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 15; Gressman, The Constitution
v. The Freund Report, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 951 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Gressman].
474. Justice Stewart is quoted as saying, "The very heavy caseload is neither intolerable nor impossible to handle." He viewed the Freund Commission's proposal "with
some misgivings." N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1973, § 4, at 6, col. 2.
475. See BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 325; Black,
The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal,83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974); Casper
& Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL. STUDIES 339 (1974);
Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247 (1973);
Gressman, supra note 473; Griswold, The Supreme Court's Case Load: Civil Rights and
Other Problems, 1973 U. ILL. L.R. 615; Symposium, Should the Appellate rurisdiction
of the United States Supreme Court Be Changed? An Evaluation of the Freund Report
Proposals,27 RUTGERS L. REv. 878 (1974).
476. Bickel, The Overworked Court, supra note 325, at 18.
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former Justice Goldberg's complaint that the proposed National Court
of Appeals would be insensitive to doctrinal development, especially in
criminal justice cases, by observing that experienced judges will know
upsets
that "the Supreme Court sometimes reverses itself, sometimes
4"' 7
directions.
new
in
out
strikes
seemingly settled law, sometimes
HI.

The Burger Court and Changing Directions

Although the Warren Court critics have professed to be puzzled
by the mixed trends of the Burger Court, others perceived some doctrinal directions more clearly. To Levy, "[t]he trend of decision . . .
by mid-1972 was abundantly clear;"4 78 and a political scientist found
as early as June, 1971, a "disposition to check, if not reverse, some
479
trends of the Warren Court in the broad domain of criminal justice.
William F. Swindler, an eminent student of the Court, could write in
1974 that "in the course of its fifth term, the Court. . . has assumed
some distinctive characteristics which lend themselves to analysis." 480
Some analysts viewed certain types of cases as barometers of developing trends; the Burger Court's decisions in confessions and search
and seizure cases raised, for one political scientist, the possibility of "direct modification of the Mapp case." 48 ' To another commentator, the
Court's disinclination to disturb the plea bargaining process meant that
"the influence of exclusionary rules, as [delineated] in Weeks, Mapp
and Miranda can be expected to remain slight."'4 2 He felt that the
"Harrisdecision might well foreshadow a full reappraisal of the [Miranda] interrogation standards." 48 3 Perhaps a slow movement was developing to return to a test of the voluntariness of confessions based
not upon the particular personal characteristics of the defendant but
upon the reasonableness of police conduct. There was also a warning
that even Chimel v. California48 4 "no longer commands the firm sup477. Id. See also BIcKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME CoURT, supra note 325.
478. LEW, supra note 25, at 421.
479. Stephens, supra note 314, at 250.
480. Swindler, The Court, the Constitution and Chief Justice Burger, 27 VAND. L
REV. 443, 444 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Swindler].
481. Gangi, The Supreme Court, Confessions, and the Counter-Revolution in Criminal Justice, 58 JurDICATURF 68, 72 (1974), citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
482. Stephens, supra note 314, at 256, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
483. Stephens, supra note 314, at 259, citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
4$4. 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (7-2 decision).
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port of a Court majority. 48 5 One critic thought that the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause and the decision in Bruton v. United
States, 4s6 which expanded it into a meaningful right, were being undermined both by the state courts of Florida and by the Burger Court,
which had "collaborated to issue a virtual rubber stamp marked 'Harmless Error' to be used whenever a possible violation of Bruton rears its
' 48
ugly head. 1 7
Intense scrutiny of the Burger Court's activities has not been limited to its criminal justice decisions. Professor Michael Tigar found
a dilution of the equal protection standards of the Warren Court, at
least in the realm of welfare equity, when a 1969 decision refused to
apply the strict scrutiny test to a Texas scheme for reduction of the benefits in various categories.4"' Professor Tigar's fear that "the Court
may arbitrarily refuse to expand any further the circle of fundamental
interests," has been realized.4 89 Even Swindler, whose view of the
Burger Court was benign, conceded that it had substituted for "one
man, one vote" a doctrine of fair and effective representation-wherein
"gross population variations might constitute prima facie evidence of
calculated malapportioment [sic]."490 If, as Swindler maintains,
"Mathematical equality itself [is now] but one of several factors that state
districting plans should take into account, '' 491 then, in the absence of any
indicators of what new or developing principles might give substance
to these generalities, serious questions of judicial goodwill are raised.
Although one cannot be particularly comforted by Swindler's
bland assertion that a "definite dichotomy has developed in the freedom of expression cases, 492 one can readily agree that the Burger
Court has made a difference in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence. The difference did not receive much attention from our most
eminent scholars. Indeed, it appears that the broad trend of Burger
485. Stephens, supra note 314, at 262.
486. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
487. Comment, The Right of Confrontation and the Use of Non-Testifying Codefendant's Confessions: Constitutional Law in Microcosm, 26 U. MIumI L. REV. 755,
775 (1972).
488. Tigar, supra note 314, at 64-65, citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970). For later developments in equal protection analysis, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
489. Tigar, supra note 314, at 65. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
490. Swindler, supra note 480, at 454.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 467.
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Court decisions, in both the criminal justice and civil rights areas, presages a return to the fragmented and doctrinally inadequate jurisprudence of the Vinson Court. Even the Warren Court critics had focused
their considerable ire on the Vinson Court's role vis-a-vis the Stone
Court. The harmless error rule in criminal cases,4 93 Powell's Harlan494
esque anti-incorporation views in the Sixth Amendment jury cases,
the relaxation of the "one man, one vote" principle, 495 and the indica-

tions that the free speech balancing test may be revived 496 constitute
some evidence of that trend.

Although there is, of course, some con-

trary movement,49? in many areas there appears to be a revival of ambiguity. Unfortunately, unlike the Stone-Vinson situation, the historical period is now different.

Doctrinal development was new in the for-

ties and early fifties and ambiguities were almost inevitable. Today,
ambiguity may well constitute retreat, and that retreat itself will be
vague, aimless, and of little value to the development of a comprehensive body of constitutional law that can provide guidance to lower court
judges. Perhaps Bickel's silence and Kuriand's hesitancy about the di-

rections of the Burger Court mirrored that increasing ambiguity, but
also perhaps reflected recognition of the impending retreat.

The main-

tenance of ambiguity may be more important to the Warren Court's
critics than their professed goal of doctrinal certainty.

It is true that,

for all of its controversy, the Warren Court did solidify the development
493. "That the harmless error doctrine will grow as a means of containing the novel
doctrines of the Warren Court in the criminal procedure field has long been anticipated.
The resulting combination of prophylactic rules and harmless error doctrine will make
each case sui generis with an additional and continuing burden on the Supreme Court
to supervise the administration of criminal justice in the state courts." Kurland,
1971 Term, supra note 313, at 288.
494. See LEvy, supra note 25, at 277.
495. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182
(1971).
496. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1 74); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). An
indication of the Nixon appointees' view of some of the major Warren Court doctrines is
often to be found in dissenting opinions. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S.
901, 902-03 (1974) (Blackmun, Burger, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 748, 759 (1971) (Burger and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
497. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). The first two cases, it should be noted, involved
executive-judicial confrontations in which the fundamental role of the courts was at
stake. The last two involved the expression of the right to counsel at trial and trial
by jury, both popularly supported rights.
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of modem doctrinal trends. The critics may well believe that complexity, rather than simplicity, should be the predominant characteristic
of the law. They may even believe that, as a political matter, any strong
and relatively unambiguous stance by the Court on controversial issues
per se exposes it to criticism. Therefore, quite apart from the critics'
own political quarrels with the Warren Court, the Court's gathering together of the loose strands of constitutional doctrine may, ultimately,
have been the most upsetting phenomenon to the critics.
This hypothesis is supported, if not entirely confirmed, by the relative inattention to the historical perspective in analyses by the Warren
Court critics. They did not stop to consider whether the nature of the
Court had anything to do with some of the developments that seemed
to startle them. Except for desegregation, they did not undertake any
close analysis of the development of legal doctrine before the Warren
Court, especially previous interpretations of the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights. They did not even consider whether the Court was truly
revolutionary or undertook as its great function to consolidate the development of inconsistent, perhaps vague, doctrine. When a precedent
was broadened, the tendency was to state that it was misconstrued;
when a precedent was overruled or distinguished, the critics made no
real inquiry into whether or not it had previously been undermined,
how far it had already been attenuated, or whether it was totally irresponsible to substitute one fiat for another. Because, as political scientists and some law professors recognized, most precedents are inconclusive or variable, the Court could choose to develop one view of constitutional law rather than another.
It is not necessary to assume that historical perspectives will engender a resounding acceptance of all that the Warren Court accomplished or tried to accomplish. It is sufficient to assert that they will
invariably mitigate the severity of the criticism, will render comprehensible some of what was incomprehensible, and will even provide a
perspective from which to judge the Burger Court meaningfully. As
one critic of the Burger Court activism noted, the Warren Court, "by
and large . . . attempted to defend its decisions in terms of inferences

from values the Constitution marks as special,"49 and succeeded. This
is especially significant in the realm of civil liberties and civil rights, because no one, including conservative members of the present Court,
498. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 943 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
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doubts that the Supreme Court today functions to protect the criminal
justice process and the rights of politically helpless minorities. 4 99
One critic who applied both rigorous standards of craftsmanship
a
historical perspective to the activities not only of the Warren
and
Court but also of its immediate predecessors was a political scientist,
Robert McCloskey. He placed the Court in a twenty-five year perspective and found much to commend. He traced the roots of the Warren
Court back to the Stone and Hughes Courts and concluded: "On the
whole the Stone-Vinson era was a creative one. . .. But it was also
. . . an era of groping readjustment, of ambivalence and uncertainty
about the judicial role."50 0 McCloskey noted that under Chief Justice
Warren, "the creative impulse becomes unmistakably dominant. The
jurisprudence of civil liberties becomes more symmetrical. ' 501 He posited the existence of a greater judicial continuity than the other critics
were willing to admit, but he recognized that the activism of the Warren
Court had expanded its role:
[The Warren Court] has claimed a part in the governing process
more imposing and more daring than any court of the past has ever
claimed. And it has played that part with enough success to suggest that our traditional ideas about the range of judicial capacity
may require reappraisal.50 2
In retrospect the great divisions between the justices, which so offended the critics, were evident from the beginning of the Stone Court.
Yet the concurrences on certain civil liberties cases were remarkable.
The white primary decisions did not bother McCloskey as they did
Wechsler, because Grovey v. Townsend 5°3 "had been a strangely unrealistic" precedent.5 04 Although the Stone Court was fairly consistent in civil rights cases, McCloskey remarked upon "some notable advances" and some "notable refusals to advance" in the realm of civil
liberties. 50° He found that the "tangled course of doctrine and rationale'"50 6 in coerced confession cases evinced at least an attempt by the
justices to discipline the police.
499. Powell referred to the Court's protection of the "constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against aggressive or discriminatory
government action" as the "irreplaceable value of [its] power" in our system of government. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
500. McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 9.
501. Id. at 10.
502. Id.
503. 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
504. McCLosnY,supra note 29, at 34.
505. Id. at 36.
506. Id. at 38.
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McCloskey had not been impressed with some Vinson Court landmark precedents that were later to be demolished by the Warren Court.
Thus, Wolf v. Colorado"" was a "strange opinion to come from a judge
who had written so eloquently on behalf of the right to privacy in federal court cases" and marked a regression in Fourth Amendment standards.50 The qualification of the right to assigned counsel in Betts v.
Brady5"' had not impressed Professor McCloskey, and he agreed that
it was experiencing a languishing death until "Justice Frankfurter restored-it to visible life in that memorable first term of the Vinson
Court. ' 5 10 McCloskey found somewhat irrational and doctrinally inadequate the fair trial rule of Betts, and noted that the Court could anticipate a deluge of petitions from prisoners.
His review of the Vinson Court concluded that the doctrinal withdrawal was more pronounced and less qualified in civil liberties cases
" ' He believed that the "political clithan in any other major area. 51
mate, the changes in personnel, the Frankfurterian preachments about
self-restraint had combined to retard doctrinal progress. 5 112 Indeed,
McCloskey contended that the existence of malapportionment related
importantly to civil liberties. Colegrove v. Green,51 3 the Gibraltar
upon which the critics stood before Baker v. Carr,51-4 hardly seemed
a solid precedent to McCloskey, who found judicial tradition on the
subject to be ambiguous.515 Thus, in his view the Vinson Court served
only a transitional function: "It kept the light of freedom alive through
a dark hour in the country's history; that light could now be passed on
to the care of its successor."5 6 McCloskey was not the only scholar
to accept the Warren revolution. Swindler concurred, noting that "the
Warren Court rounded out a cycle of constitutional change which has
ranged over three decades and completed a revolution in national history which began in the crisis of the New Deal and moved forward log507. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
508. McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 101. McCloskey attributes the judicial zigzag
in Fourth Amendment cases to the replacement of Justices Murphy and Rutledge with
Justices Clark and Minton after the 1948 term. Id. at 97.
509. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
510. McCLosKEY, supranote 29, at 101.
511. Id. at 121.
512. Id. at 124. He intoned: "The literature of political science almost universally
condemned the injustice of malapportionment and blamed it for the rurally oriented
backwardness of our political system." Id. at 122.
513. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
514. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
515. McCLosKEY, supra note 29, at 122-23.
516. Id. at 126.
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ically and inexorably to the present. '517 Whether or not the revolution
was completed before 1970, when Swindler made this observation, it
is clear that if we are regressing to the Vinson Court, we are regressing
far indeed.
It would be unfair to argue that the critics had no historical perspective; they did, but it was fleeting and symbolic. For instance,
Bickel conceded that the Warren Court was not unique; "it is more
nearly true that the Court has traveled the main highway of the institution's history." 518 He also admitted that historians may well view the
accomplishments of that body through different lenses from those of
its contemporary critics: "Historians a generation or two hence . . .
may barely note, and care little about, method, logic, or intellectual coherence .

.

. .-51

Did this excuse or at least explain the Warren

Court's failures? Bickel sternly admonished that "intellectual incoherence is not excusable and is no more tolerable because it has occurred
before."520 Kurland agreed and added that the Marshall Court had
more leeway than did one confronting a solid body of precedent. John
Marshall, Roger Taney, William Howard Taft, and others notwithstanding, history for the critics was a distant and abstract consideration; it
was never combined with an appreciation of its relationship to doctrinal
development in our time.
But beyond disinclination to view the Warren Court in historical
perspective, there is also a pervasive equanimity toward the Burger
Court; much of that equianimity may be attributed to the critics' endorsement of both that Court's political mood and its judicial role. Certainly, an affinity for the latter seems indisputable. The Burger Court
has generally evinced great tolerance of both Congress and the state
legislatures and has endorsed the good faith attempts of both to resolve
policy difficulties. That judicial sympathy has extended to the police
and other executive agencies of government, and the activities of those
agencies have been approved frequently enough to justify Levy's characterization of the Burger Court as "conservative activist" rather than
merely restrained.5 21 Perhaps, ironically, the new Court's deference to
legislative initiatives is due in part to the respect for a new responsive517. Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a ConstitutionalRevolution, 23
L. REV. 205, 206 (1970).
518. BIcKEL, THE IDEA OF PRoGaEss, supra note 2, at 2.
519. Id. at 11.
520. Id. at 47.
521. L vy, supra note 25, at 20. "In his willingness to reassess and even root out
much that the judiciary took for granted, [Burger] was a 'radical' in the literal sense
of that word." Id. "Burger is no more a strict constructionist than Douglas. The
VAND.
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ness, and perhaps that responsiveness is a legacy of the Warren Court's
reapportionment revolution. But even if this is true, it cannot be the
entire story.
A similarity in mood between Court and critic, a shared sentiment
that it was time to begin to trust other branches of government, that
the nation was inherently stable or at least capable of being stabilized,
and that some semblance of authority could be restored after the sixties,
is not surprising. These attitudes were shared not only by the Court
and its critics but by a large segment of the American people.
To understand fully what those critics were talking about at one
time and what they are talking about now, it is necessary to underscore
the inelu-ctable truth that legal criticism, no less than any other intellectual activity, is a product of its time. Attitudes are not formed in a
vacuum; the Warren Court critics were as affected as the Court itself
by the larger issues of the superheated sixties and the disillusioned seventies. Yet, that generalization tells us little of how they were affected,
of what was distinctive in their reactions, or of just how much who the
critics were would determine what they said.
The last question has already been at least partially answered.
They were advocates of a particular philosophy; they were hero worshippers of justices like Frankfurter and Jackson. They matured intellectually in the thirties and forties when there was little or no question that the Court was a nondemocratic institution. The concept that
the Court's very existence violated every political precept upon which
America was based ran strongly through their writings; the countertheme, that Americans seemed to have a propensity for government
by judiciary, seemed almost foreign. The critics seemed to worry endlessly about Dred Scott,522 Lochner,52 3 and other self-inflicted wounds.
They constantly teetered on the edge of a paradox: the Court does
not and should not govern and yet, even when it performs its proper
function, it is always being threatened and is perennially under siege.
Conclusion
The Warren Court's passion for defending human liberty cannot
be ignored simply because of certain linguistic quarrels with its rhetoric.
It is ironic that men like Bickel, so concerned with liberty, should have
Chief Justice is, rather, a 'judicial conservative' in Nixon's usage of that term." Id. at
32.
522. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
523. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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been most upset with the one institution in America in the fifties that
was willing to give content to its great maxims. To understand the origin of the alienation from the Warren Court is neither to excuse some
of that body's excesses nor to cavil at its most sensitive critics. To understand may not be to forgive, nor can it justify a disregard for the
inherent validity and seriousness of what the critics were doing.
Rather, if I have stressed some overt and covert assumptions made by
the major critics-Freund, Kurland, and Bickel-it is to offer another
perspective, a perspective that emphasizes the inability to translate categories and modes of thought from one era to another.
The Warren Court, for good or evil, did create a new universe
of discourse; it did stimulate massive changes in American life. More importantly, we should understand, if we can, why the Court's critics
choose to speak in muted terms two decades later, when that universe
of discourse has changed. Only if we understand both the strengths
and weaknesses of the Warren Court and its critics can we gain the
knowledge to judge whether the Burger Court is fulfilling the destiny
of the modem Supreme Court or, in some measure, betraying it.

